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WHITE TAPE AND INDIAN WARDS:
REMOVING THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY TO EMPOWER
TRIBAL ECONOMIES AND SELF-GOVERNMENT
Adam Crepelle *

ABSTRACT
American Indians have the highest poverty rate in the United States, and dire
poverty ensnares many reservations. With no private sector and abysmal
infrastructure, reservations are frequently likened to third-world countries. Presentday Indian poverty is a direct consequence of present-day federal Indian law and
policy. Two-hundred-year-old laws premised on Indian incompetency remain a
part of the U.S. legal system; accordingly, Indian country is bound by heaps of
federal regulations that apply nowhere else in the United States. The federal
regulatory structure impedes tribal economic development and prevents tribes from
controlling their own resources.
This Article asserts the federal regulatory “white tape” is unconstitutional. By
focusing on restraints upon trust land and Indian trader laws, this Article
demonstrates that contemporary federal regulations impeding tribal economic
development are based upon flagrantly racist ideas. This Article explores the
unique relationship between Indians and the Constitution and concludes that
restrictions on tribal trust land and Indian trader laws should be subjected to
strict scrutiny rather than the usual rational basis review applied to legislation
relating to Indians. These regulations cannot survive strict scrutiny. Once tribes
are liberated from these antiquated regulations, this Article proposes that tribes be
able to craft their own land use and economic policies without federal approval.
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“The biggest obstacle to Indian economic development is
white tape.”
– Ernest Sickey,
former Chairman of the
Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana

INTRODUCTION
President Reagan said, “The nine most terrifying words in the
English language are: I’m from the Government, and I’m here to
help.” 1 Nobody knows this better than the Indians. 2 For thousands
of years before European contact, Indians had robust free market
economies. 3 Indians developed a legal system to facilitate commerce, 4 and goods flowed over a thousand miles from their sites of
1. Ronald Reagan, The President’s News Conference (Aug. 12, 1986).
2. Indian is used in this Article to denote the indigenous peoples of present-day North
America. This article uses the term “Indian” rather than “Native American” because it is the
proper legal term as well as the preferred term of many Indians. See, e.g., Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians, CHOCTAW, choctaw.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2021); S. UTE INDIAN TRIBE,
https://www.southernute-nsn.gov/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2021); QUINAULT INDIAN NATION,
http://www.quinaultindiannation.com/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2021).
3. Adam Crepelle, Decolonizing Reservation Economies: Returning to Private Enterprise and
Trade, 12 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 413, 418 (2019) (“Indians wanted a greater variety
of goods than were available on their land; hence, indigenous societies went to great lengths
to facilitate commerce.”); Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism Succeed?, 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 765 (2001) (“Indians also regularly traded
goods with other peoples from near and far both for survival and to make life as comfortable as possible. The majority, if not all, of this trade was conducted in free market situations
where private individuals voluntarily came together to buy and sell items they had manufactured for sale and which they exchanged by barter and sometimes even sold for money.”).
4. Crepelle, supra note 3, at 419 (“Tribes also developed laws to facilitate commerce
that among other things, enabled individuals to purchase items on credit.”); Miller, supra
note 3, at 792 (“Some Indians also gave guarantees on their products and on brides, and
had well-established rules of trade.”); Adam Crepelle & Walter E. Block, Property Rights and
Freedom: The Keys to Improving Life in Indian Country, 23 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST.
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origin. Thanks to dynamic economies, Indians were healthy and
prosperous. 6 Indians understood economics; thus, Indians easily
incorporated Europeans into their trade networks.7
Soon after the nation’s inception, the United States implemented a series of laws governing Indian trade. 8 The laws were supposedly designed to protect Indians from unscrupulous dealings with
non-Indians because Indians were deemed incompetent. 9 In 1823,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the United States owned the

315, 341 (2017) (“These markets were governed by rules and used standardized systems of
measurements.”).
5. Michael Mozdy, Cacao in Chaco Canyon, NAT. HIST. MUSEUM UTAH: BLOG (Aug. 4,
2016), https://nhmu.utah.edu/blog/2016/08/04/cacao-chaco-canyon [https://perma.cc/
NCK8-KCZX] (“Crown had found the first evidence that cacao had indeed found its way to
the American Southwest, some 1200 miles north of where it grows. The Ancestral Puebloans
were using cacao in much the same way as the Maya, it seems.”); see also Jasmine Kabatay,
Ancient Quinoa Seeds Found in Ontario Shed Light on Indigenous Trade, CBC NEWS (Jan. 16,
2019),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/quinoa-trading-brantford-1.4980974
[https://perma.cc/2BRP-RRA8]; Ann M. Carlos & Frank D. Lewis, Exchange Among Native
Americans and Europeans Before 1800: Strategies and Interactions 10 (Oct. 26–28, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.economichistory.ca/pdfs/2012/carlos-lewis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T2EW-PUBC] (“The Northern Plains were lightly populated, yet as in
other regions, aboriginal peoples developed elaborate, long-distance, trading arrangements.
In a prehistoric site in South Dakota there are artifacts from Florida, the Gulf coast, and
both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.”).
6. Karethy (Kay) Edwards & Beverly Patchell, State of the Science: A Cultural View of Native Americans and Diabetes Prevention, J. CULTURAL DIVERSITY, Spring 2009, at 32 (“Native
Americans have a rich history of healthy food systems and prosperous agricultural economies.”); DEVON A. MIHESUAH, RECOVERING OUR ANCESTORS’ GARDENS: INDIGENOUS RECIPES
AND GUIDE TO DIET AND FITNESS 47–54 (2005); Crepelle & Block, supra note 4, at 316 (“Explorers noted the American Indians were better nourished and more physically robust than
the people of Europe.”); id. at 340 (“Some Indians were better businessmen than others, so
horses were unevenly distributed. Indeed, some Indians owned over 1,000 horses.”).
7. Miller, supra note 3, at 788 (“After Europeans arrived on this continent, the extensive and well-established tribal trading networks led to the spread of European goods to
many tribes long before they met their first white people.”); Bill Yellowtail, Indian Sovereignty,
PERC REPS., Summer 2006, at 10 (“Fabricating iron implements at their portable forge, they
bartered them for the corn and squash that sustained the Corps of Discovery through the
bitterly cold winter. A few months and a thousand miles later, Lewis was astonished to arrive
in the Nez Perce community and find that one of these trade axes had proceeded him.”).
8. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, ch. 33 § 4, 1 Stat.
137, 138 (1790) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 177); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax
Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 688 (1965) (“In the very first volume of the federal statutes is found
an Act, passed in 1790 by the first Congress, ‘to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes,’ requiring that Indian traders obtain a license from a federal official, and specifying in detail the conditions on which such licenses would be granted.”).
9. Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 163 (1980) (“In 1790, Congress
passed a statute regulating the licensing of Indian traders. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat.
137. Ever since that time, the Federal Government has comprehensively regulated trade
with Indians to prevent ‘fraud and imposition’ upon them.”); Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S.
129, 136 (1922) (“The purpose of the section clearly is to protect the inexperienced, dependent and improvident Indians from the avarice and cunning of unscrupulous men in
official position and at the same time to prevent officials from being tempted, as they otherwise might be, to speculate on that inexperience or upon the necessities and weaknesses of
these ‘Wards of the Nation.’ ”).
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Indians’ land and the Indians merely occupied it. The Supreme
Court later built upon this principle to classify tribes as “domestic
dependent nations” rather than full sovereigns and named the
United States guardian of the Indian wards. 11 Indians lost their
freedom.
Though the Indian wars have ended and Indians now have full
rights of citizenship, 12 tribes remain shackled by an antiquated legal system designed to subjugate them. The great Indian law scholar Felix Cohen found that Indians are subject to over 2,200 more
regulations than other American citizens. 13 Consequently, every
transaction involving Indians on a reservation requires federal approval. As a result of these rules, it takes forty-nine steps to engage
in energy production on a reservation, while the same energy production takes four steps off the reservation. 14 The result is that a
business can begin producing oil in about three months off a reservation, yet tribes have to wait nearly three years to drill for oil on
their land. 15 Likewise, an act as simple as executing a mortgage on
the reservation requires the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 16 As one federal court put it, the federal government’s attitude
towards the Indians “can only be characterized as bureaucratic imperialism.” 17
Indian country’s 18 nonsensically complex regulatory framework
was not born of indigenous ingenuity; rather, Indian country’s byzantine legal landscape is a consequence of centuries-old colonial
ideology. That is, the red tape is not red at all—it’s white. Indeed,

10. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584–85 (1823) (“It has never been
doubted, that either the United States, or the several States, had a clear title to all the lands
within the boundary lines described in the treaty, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish that right, was vested in that government
which might constitutionally exercise it.”).
11. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b).
13. Felix Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62
YALE L.J. 348, 352 (1953).
14. Shawn E. Regan & Terry L. Anderson, The Energy Wealth of Indian Nations, 3 LSU J.
ENERGY L. & RES. 195, 208 (2014) (“On Indian lands, companies must go through four federal agencies and 49 steps to acquire a permit to drill, compared with only four steps when
drilling off of the reservation.”).
15. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFS., TRANSCRIPT OF TRIBAL
CONSULTATION, IDENTIFYING ECONOMIC PRIORITIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY 5 (Aug. 17, 2017)
(“When they’re drilling off reservation, it takes them about four months to get all the permitting process off reservation . . . . On reservation, it takes 31 months for no other reason
than it’s our fault.”).
16. 25 U.S.C. § 5135(a); 25 C.F.R. § 152.34 (2019).
17. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1130 (D.D.C. 1976) (“This attitude, which can
only be characterized as bureaucratic imperialism, manifested itself in deliberate attempts to
frustrate, debilitate, and generally prevent from functioning the tribal governments expressly preserved by § 28 of the Act.”).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
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the trust land system was predicated upon Indian imbecility, and its
19
goal was to transfer Indian land to whites. Nonetheless, trust land
remains Indian country’s dominant land tenure system. 20 Indian
trader laws are even blunter in their racial categories of “white persons” and “full blood Indians,” yet Indian trader laws remain part
of the U.S. Code. 21 Though the United States has disavowed racist
ideology, 22 laws rooted in Indian inferiority are the dinosaur that
won’t die. 23
The Constitution does not apply to Indian tribes, 24 but Congress
is bound by the Constitution and constrained by the Fifth
Amendment when legislating in Indian affairs. 25 The Fifth
Amendment prohibits the United States from enacting arbitrary
laws or laws that discriminate based upon race without a compelling rationale. 26 The trust land restrictions and Indian trader laws
are overtly racist by design; moreover, both laws are irrational and
further no legitimate government purpose in their current form. 27
Accordingly, the constitutionality of the unjust trust land and trader regulations—which do nothing but trap Indians in poverty—
should be challenged. The laws should be struck down as obsolete
impediments to tribal self-government and economic development.

19.
20.

See infra Section IV.A for a discussion of allotment.
FED. RSRV. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, Navigating Land Issues, in TRIBAL LEADERS
HANDBOOK ON HOMEOWNERSHIP 79, 79 (2018) (noting trust lands are “[t]he most common
form of land tenure in Indian country.”).
21. 25 U.S.C. §§ 261–264.
22. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17); Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–284, 82 Stat. 73
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.); see, e.g., 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619; see also Chinese Exclusion Acts, ch. 126, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58
(1882), repealed by An Act to Repeal the Chinese Exclusion Acts, ch. 344, Pub. L. No. 78-199,
57 Stat. 600 (1943).
23. Adam Crepelle, Lies, Damn Lies, and Federal Indian Law, 44 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 532 (2021); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST
COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 123 (2005); U.N.
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 59th Sess., 1475th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/SR.1475 (Aug. 6, 2001) (describing the U.S. Indian policy as “out of step with
contemporary legal developments in indigenous rights”).
24. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns preexisting the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”).
25. Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 73–74 (1977).
26. See infra Part III.
27. But see Joseph William Singer, Indian Title: Unraveling the Racial Context of Property
Rights, or How to Stop Engaging in Conquest, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 34 (2017) (noting trust
land continues to exist because “in part because most Indian nations want it to continue to
exist. They support it because the restraint on alienation preserves the tribal land base”).
Preserving tribal land bases is unquestionably rational as the United States agreed to this
much in hundreds of treaties; however, the regulations currently encumbering trust land
are irrational. A far simpler and better option is discussed infra.
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Once the unconstitutional white tape is peeled from Indian
country, tribes must be empowered to self-govern. In 1970, President Nixon sought to grant tribal governments greater control
over their economic and political destinies because even wellmeaning federal programs “have frequently proved to be ineffec28
tive and demeaning.” Congress adopted a policy of tribal self29
determination in 1975. Every President and Congress since has
30
embraced tribal self-determination.
Thirteen years after President Nixon announced tribal selfdetermination as the United States’ Indian policy, however, President Reagan stated:
[S]ince 1975, there has been more rhetoric than action. Instead of fostering and encouraging self-government, federal
policies have by and large inhibited the political and economic development of the tribes. Excessive regulation and
self-perpetuating bureaucracy have stifled local decision
making, thwarted Indian control of Indian resources, and
31
promoted dependency rather than self-sufficiency.
President Reagan expressed a desire to remove impediments to
32
tribal self-government and economic development; nevertheless,
the year 2021 has come, and President Reagan’s remarks are just as
relevant.
Tribal self-determination and Orwellian federal oversight are
entirely at odds. Federal Indian law and its nearly two-century-long
interdiction of tribes is the greatest inhibitor of tribal self-

28. Special Message on Indian Affairs, 213 PUB. PAPERS 564, 565 (July 8, 1970).
29. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93–
638, 88 Stat. 2203, amended by 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5423.
30. See, e.g., Alysa Landry, Jimmy Carter: Signed ICWA into Law, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
(Sept. 12, 2017), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/jimmy-carter-signedicwa-into-law-GtsQUN5tRkG1iNzMVHJP8g/ [https://perma.cc/X4HS-9FDQ] (“During his
presidential campaign in 1976, Carter’s staff reached out to the National Congress of American Indians and the National Tribal Chairmen’s Association. Carter met briefly with some
leaders and his staff drafted a position paper that endorsed Indian self-determination policy,
already in force.”); Remarks on Signing the Indian Self-Determination Assistance Act
Amendments of 1988, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1284, 1284–85 (Oct. 5, 1988); Statement Reaffirming
the Government-to-Government Relationship Between the Federal Government and Indian
Tribal Governments, 1 PUB. PAPERS 662, 662–63 (June 14, 1991); Exec. Order No. 13175, 65
Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000); Statement on Signing the Executive Order on Consultation
and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2487, 2487–88 (Nov. 6,
2000); Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relationship with Tribal Governments, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2177, 2177 (Sept. 23, 2004); EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, 2016
WHITE HOUSE TRIBAL NATIONS CONFERENCE PROGRESS REPORT: A RENEWED ERA OF FEDERALTRIBAL RELATIONS 4 (2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files
/docs/whncaa_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XR6V-W2X5].
31. Statement on Indian Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 96, 96 (Jan. 24, 1983).
32. Id.
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determination and economic development. Without the legal capacity to control their land and resources, tribes cannot choose
their own paths. Self-determination cannot occur while tribes re34
main laden with the yoke of wardship. As long as federal Indian
law remains underpinned by archaic assumptions about the United
States’ indigenous peoples and that might makes right, Indians will
remain a conquered people living under an immiserating colonial
35
regime.
This Article asserts that displacing antiquated federal rules with
tribal law is the key to tribal economic development. Tribal ownership and sovereignty over tribal land must be recognized in lieu of
the current tribal trust land system. Similarly, tribes must be free to
enact and apply their own economic regulations to all persons
within their territory. Controlling land and the people within it is
the essence of sovereignty, 36 and the United States signed hundreds of treaties affirming tribes’ right to exist as sovereigns. 37 As
Justice Neil Gorsuch recently wrote, honoring tribal treaty rights “is
the least we can do.” 38 Making tribal law the preeminent authority
in Indian country furthers the U.S. policy of tribal selfdetermination and will ignite long dormant tribal economies.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides data on
Indian poverty and natural resources. Part II discusses the trust
land and Indian trader framework. Part III examines how the Constitution applies to Indians, and Part IV argues that the trust land
and Indian trader scheme is unconstitutional. Part V explores tribal governance once Indian trader laws and trust land restrictions
are removed.

33. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (explaining that tribes
are like wards of the federal government).
34. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014) (“Indian
tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations’ that exercise ‘inherent sovereign authority.’ ” (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
505, 509 (1991))).
35. E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, No. CR 03-1443, 2005 WL 6437828, at *8
(Eastern Cherokee Sup. Ct. 2005) (Philo, J., concurring); Crepelle, supra note 23, at 571
(“Principles of justice are not the determinative factor in contemporary federal Indian law
cases; instead, federal Indian law cases often hearken to the Melian Dialogue wherein
mighty Athens told Melos, ‘[R]ight, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in
power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.’ ”).
36. See, e.g., Sovereignty, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
sovereignty [https://perma.cc/8A6M-GDE4].
37. See Hansi Lo Wang, Broken Promises on Display at Native American Treaties Exhibit, NPR:
CODESWITCH (Jan. 18, 2015, 4:57 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/
01/18/368559990/broken-promises-on-display-at-native-american-treaties-exhibit [https://
perma.cc/CNX9-ZL9U].
38. Wash. Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1021 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99,
142 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Great nations, like great men, should keep their word.”).
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I. INDIAN POVERTY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
The opening line of a 1928 report on the condition of Indians
infamously states, “An overwhelming majority of the Indians are
39
poor, even extremely poor . . . .” Fortunately the majority of Indians are no longer poor. Poverty, however, remains a significant
problem for Indians, as they have the highest poverty rate in the
United States at twenty-six percent compared to fourteen percent
40
for the United States overall. The Indian median income is
41
$39,719 versus the overall U.S. median income of $57,617. These
figures do not distinguish between Indians based upon residence
on or off the reservation. Due to institutional differences discussed
42
later in this Article, the poverty rate is worse on reservations. For
example, eight of the ten poorest counties in the United States are
43
majority Indian, though Indians compose less than two percent of
44
the United States’ population. The Indian poverty rate is high be45
cause there are few jobs on reservations. The average reservation
46
unemployment rate was fifty percent even before COVID-19 —
47
twice the U.S. unemployment rate during the Great Depression.

39.
40.

THE INST. FOR GOV’T RSCH., THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 3 (1928).
American Indian and Alaska Native Heritage Month: November 2017, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/facts-for-features/2017/aianmonth.html [https://perma.cc/L46H-BW9J].
41. Id.
42. Making Indian Country Count: Native Americans and the 2020 Census: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 115th Cong. 26 (2018) (statement of James T. Tucker, Pro Bono
Voting Rights Couns., Native Am. Rights Fund), https://www.indian.senate.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/CHRG-115shrg29840.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YDQ-ZHWA] (“Native Americans have the highest poverty rate of any population group, at 26.6 percent. On
federally recognized Indian reservations in Alaska Native villages, that rate is 38.3 percent.”).
43. Unemployment on Indian Reservations at 50 Percent: The Urgent Need to Create Jobs in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 111th Cong. 2 (2010) [hereinafter S.
Hearing, Unemployment] (statement of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan, Chairman, S. Comm. On Indian Affs.).
44. Facts for Features: American Indian and Alaska Native Heritage Month: November 2015,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/facts-for-features/
2015/cb15-ff22.html [https://perma.cc/G78L-WU2U].
45. See Living Conditions, NATIVE AM. AID, http://www.nativepartnership.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=naa_livingconditions [https://perma.cc/MGB2-MTJX] (“The scarcity of jobs and lack of economic opportunity mean that, depending on the reservation, four
to eight out of ten adults on reservations are unemployed.”); Problems Within the Indian Reservation, IT’S A HARD LIFE FOR US, https://lifeonthereservation.weebly.com/reservationproblems.html [https://perma.cc/B5VA-L4ZA] (“Finding jobs and finding success is difficult on the reservation.”).
46. S. Hearing, Unemployment, supra note 43, at 1.
47. See Kimberly Amadeo, Unemployment Rate by Year Since 1929 Compared to Inflation and
GDP, BALANCE (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/unemployment-rate-by-year3305506 [https://perma.cc/N7Q9-T57Q].
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Prior to the pandemic, the United States as a whole had an unem48
ployment rate of approximately four percent.
Reservation poverty redounds into other areas that deter economic development. Most of the roads in Indian country are “un49
improved earth and gravel” and regarded as the worst in the
50
United States. Indian country’s water conditions are even worse
than the roads, as a 2016 House Committee on Natural Resources
Report found that “Over a half million people - nearly forty-eight
percent of tribal homes - in Native communities across the United
States do not have access to reliable water sources, clean drinking
51
water, or basic sanitation.” Similarly, many reservation residents
52
lack electricity; hence, thirty-five percent of Indian country resi53
dents lack access to broadband. This lack of infrastructure crip54
ples Indian country economic development efforts. Despite hav48. Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. (Feb. 9, 2020,
12:05:33 PM), https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 [https://perma.cc/ZD2APVK6].
49. Examining Tribal Transportation in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 111th Cong. 14 (2010) (statement of Hon. Jefferson Keel, President, Nat’l Cong. of
Am. Indians).
50. See, e.g., Enhancing Tribal Self–Governance and Safety of Indian Roads: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Indian Affs., 116th Cong. 21 (2019) (statement of Hon. Joe Garcia, Head Councilman, Ohkay Owingeh Pueblo) (“Altogether, the 42,000 miles of roads in Indian Country
are still among the most underdeveloped, unsafe, and poorly maintained road networks in
the nation . . . .”).
51. DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF H. COMM. ON NAT. RES., 114TH CONG., WATER DELAYED IS
WATER DENIED: HOW CONGRESS HAS BLOCKED ACCESS TO WATER FOR NATIVE FAMILIES, at i
(Oct.
10,
2016),
https://naturalresources.house.gov/imo/media/doc/House%20
Water%20Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/VKR8-MVLW].
52. Native Energy: Rural Electrification on Tribal Lands, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. (June 24,
2014),
https://rmi.org/blog_2014_06_24_native_energy_rural_electrification_on_tribal_
lands [https://perma.cc/E9AD-JEDR] (“If I told you about a place where almost 40 percent
of the people live without electricity, over 90 percent live below the poverty line, and the
unemployment rate exceeds 80 percent, you might be picturing a rural village in Africa or
some other developing country. However, this community is actually within U.S. borders.
I’m talking about the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, home to the Oglala Lakota.”); Laurel Morales, For Many Navajos, Getting Hooked Up to the Power Grid Can Be LifeChanging, NPR (May 29, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/
05/29/726615238/for-many-navajos-getting-hooked-up-to-the-power-grid-can-be-lifechanging [https://perma.cc/RA45-LAXB] (“About 10% of Navajos on the reservation live
without electricity.”); Energy and Minerals, NAT’L. CONG. AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/
policy-issues/land-natural-resources/energy-and-minerals
[https://perma.cc/DMD8WREQ] (“Many tribal homes lack access to electricity and affordable heating sources.”).
53. U.S. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC 18-10, INQUIRY CONCERNING DEPLOYMENT OF
ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY TO ALL AMERICANS IN A REASONABLE AND
TIMELY FASHION 22 (2018).
54. U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., BROKEN PROMISES: CONTINUING FEDERAL FUNDING
SHORTFALL FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 169 (2018), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/12-20Broken-Promises.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTE7-U2SK] (“Unfortunately, with dangerous
conditions due to impassible roads and a lack of public transportation options, Native Americans encounter issues traveling to and from a job, traveling to school, accessing health care
and emergency services, and even accessing the ballot box, all of which create barriers to
economic development and growth in Indian Country.”); Seth Tupper, Where Water Is Life,
Many on the Pine Ridge Reservation Go Thirsty, HIGHCOUNTRYNEWS (May 27, 2019),
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ing trust and treaty obligations to provide suitable and safe condi55
tions on reservations, the United States drastically fails to fund
56
services and infrastructure for Indian tribes.
The dire economic conditions of Indians on reservations are
particularly troublesome because tribes hold significant natural re57
sources. In fact, Indian reservations contain a substantial portion
58
of the United States’ oil, gas, uranium, and coal reserves. Tribes
are rich in renewable resources as well. For example, fifty million
homes could be powered by wind energy generated by Great Plains

https://www.hcn.org/articles/tribal-affairs-where-water-is-life-those-on-the-pine-ridgereservation-go-thirsty [https://perma.cc/K2H9-HNQ6] (“Historically, a dearth of water and
related infrastructure have contributed to persistent poverty on the reservations.”).
55. MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 181–82 (2016) (“The general trust
relationship simply obligates and authorizes the federal government to protect tribal and
Indian property rights, preserve and enhance tribal self-governance, guarantee law and order in Indian country, and provide government services to Indian people.”); ROBERT J.
MILLER, RESERVATION CAPITALISM 40 (2012) (“This [trust] duty requires Congress and the
executive branch to exercise the responsibilities of a guardian on behalf of Indians and
tribes.”); Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, BUREAU INDIAN AFFS.,
https://www.bia.gov/frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/HNV6-2DBC] (“The
federal Indian trust responsibility is also a legally enforceable fiduciary obligation on the
part of the United States to protect tribal treaty rights, lands, assets, and resources, as well as
a duty to carry out the mandates of federal law with respect to American Indian and Alaska
Native tribes and villages.”).
56. E.g., NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS & THE LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, TRIBES
TRANSPORTATION: POLICY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2013),
AND
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/Tribes_and_Transportation_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W9FR-A3YA] (“Due to pronounced and ongoing funding discrepancies,
state governments spend between $4,000 and $5,000 per road mile on state road and highway maintenance. In contrast, road maintenance spending in Indian Country is less than
$500 per road-mile.”); Adam Crepelle, Reservation Water Crisis: American Indians and Third
World Water Conditions, 32 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 157, 174 (“[T]he United States drastically underfunds tribal water safety— tribes receive only $0.75 for every $100 needed from the Safe
Drinking Water Revolving Fund, which is less than a third of what the least-funded state receives. The United States consistently spends substantially more money improving water
safety in foreign countries than it does improving drinking water quality on Indian reservations.”).
57. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO–15–502, INDIAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT:
POOR MANAGEMENT BY BIA HAS HINDERED ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS 1
(2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670701.pdf [https://perma.cc/59J7-5KHY] [hereinafter INDIAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT] (“Indian energy resources hold significant potential
for development, but remain largely undeveloped. For instance, Indian tribes and tribal
members, collectively, are the third largest owner of domestic mineral resources, including
oil, gas, and coal.”); MAURA GROGAN, REBECCA MORSE & APRIL YOUPEE-ROLL, REVENUE
WATCH INST., UNITED STATES NATIVE AMERICAN LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT
4
(2011),
https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/RWI_
Native_American_Lands_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUF6-TCE5] (“American Indian
lands contain vast amounts of natural resources—both renewable and nonrenewable . . . .”).
58. Regan & Anderson, supra note 14, at 196; see also SHAWN REGAN & TERRY L.
ANDERSON, PROP. & ENV’T RSCH. CTR, GEORGE W. BUSH INST., THE ENERGY WEALTH OF
INDIAN NATIONS 2 (2013), https://www.perc.org/wp-content/uploads/old/GWBIEnergyWealthIndianNations.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WM5-8WEK] (“Indian reservations
contain almost 30% of the nation’s coal reserves west of the Mississippi, 50% of potential
uranium reserves, and 20% of known oil and gas reserves . . . .”).
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59

tribes. Tribes also have tremendous potential to produce energy
60
using biomass, geothermal, solar, and hydroelectric means. Nevertheless, Indian country’s energy potential has barely been
61
touched.
Indian country’s immense resource wealth remains untapped
due to a complex regulatory framework that applies nowhere else
in the United States. That framework is the subject of Part II.
II. WHITE TAPE: THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN
INDIAN COUNTRY
Navigating the regulatory framework in Indian country is tricky
due to peculiar federal rules governing trade and land use. From a
legal and business perspective, the most crucial factor is determining the status of the land at issue, as the land within Indian country
comes in a variety of categories. Trust land is the most common
62
type of land in Indian country. The federal government holds title to trust land, while the tribe or an individual Indian is the bene63
ficiary of the trust. Restricted fee land is owned by an individual
Indian or the tribe; however, restricted fee land cannot be alienat64
ed without federal approval. Restricted fee land operates under

59. Peter Meisen & Trevor Erberich, GLOBAL ENERGY NETWORK INST., Renewable Energy
on Tribal Lands, https://www.geni.org/globalenergy/research/renewable-energy-on-triballands/Renewable-Energy-on-Tribal-Lands.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FSA-K724] (“In fact, according to the Intertribal Council on Utility Policy, the wind resources on Tribal lands in
the Great Planes alone could power over 50 million homes.”).
60. Indian Energy and Economic Development, Renewable and Distributed Generation, U.S.
DEP’T INTERIOR, BUREAU INDIAN AFFS., https://www.indianaffairs.gov/as-ia/ieed/divisionenergy-and-mineral-development/renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/5JEB-QSEK]; Indian
Energy Development: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 110th Cong. 47 (2008) (statement of Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Dir., Off. of Indian Energy & Econ. Dev., Off. of the Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affs., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior), https://www.indian.senate.gov/sites/
default/files/upload/files/May12008.pdf [https://perma.cc/VYZ8-NF4H].
61. INDIAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT, supra note 57, at 1 (noting Indian energy resources
“remain largely undeveloped”); Shawn Regan, Tribal Energy Resources: Reducing Barriers to Opportunity, PROP. & ENV’T RSCH. CTR. (July 23, 2018), https://www.perc.org/2018/07/23/
tribal-energy-resources-reducing-barriers-to-opportunity/#_ftnref10
[https://perma.cc
/CWH5-5H6T] (“88 percent of Indian lands with energy potential have yet to be developed.”).
62. CTR. FOR INDIAN COUNTRY DEV., FED. RSRV. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, TRIBAL LEADERS
HANDBOOK
ON
HOMEOWNERSHIP
79
(Patrick
H.
Kunesh
ed.,
2018),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/community/indiancountry/resourceseducation/cicd-tribal-leaders-handbook-on-homeownership.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc
/D7BQ-WUBB].
63. Id.; Definition of “Indian Country,” NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/nrcs141p2_024362.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ELU3-RDK5].
64. TRIBAL LEADERS HANDBOOK ON HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 62, at 80.
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65

the same constraints as trust land. Then there’s plain old fee
land, where an individual owns title to the land and can freely sell
66
the land. Fee land is the predominant land tenure form through67
out the United States.
Curiously, the law applied on fee lands within a reservation depends on whether the land is owned by an Indian or a nonIndian—tribal law applies if it is owned by an Indian, while state
68
law applies if the owner is a non-Indian. All three types of land
are frequently intermixed resulting in “checkerboarding,” alternat69
ing tracts of fee and trust land. Checkerboarding creates an extremely impractical jurisdictional scheme that only benefits those
70
“who benefit from confusion and uncertainty.” Further muddling
the system, jurisdictional disputes relating to whether land is Indi-

65. Thomas M. Fitzpatrick, Wash. Ass’n Prosecuting Att’ys, Land Use Regulation on Reservation Fee Lands: Where Do We Go From Here?, MRSC.ORG (June 21, 2003), http://mrsc.org/
getmedia/12b1a3a4-2b95-43a8-a5b9-815b97a2853a/LandUseRegReservation.pdf.aspx
[https://perma.cc/KDM3-DJ38].
66. TRIBAL LEADERS HANDBOOK ON HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 62, at 80.
67. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Real Estate Rights and Registration in
the USA, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
712d86cf-a278-471f-9785-c3fc170caf9f [https://perma.cc/5M7N-79TU] (“Fee simple title
and ground leasehold title are the most common forms of US commercial real estate ownership.”); James Kimmons, Fee Simple Ownership in Real Estate: Definition and Exceptions, BALANCE
SMALL BUS. (July 25, 2019), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/fee-simple-ownership-in-realestate-2866601 [https://perma.cc/Y5CV-9YHZ] (“This is by far the most common form of
ownership in the U.S., and most single-family homes fall under this type of ownership.”);
Cara O’Neill, Common Types of Real Property Ownership, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/common-types-real-property-ownership.html [https://perma.cc/UUJ7-PLN7]
(noting fee simple “is the most common type of interest.”).
68. CTR. FOR INDIAN COUNTRY DEV., supra note 62, at 80 (“When owned by a tribe or
individual within the boundaries of a reservation, fee lands are subject to tribal jurisdiction.”); Jessica A. Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow: American Indian Property, Sovereignty, and the
Future, 115 MICH. L. REV. 487, 489 (2017) (“Property jurisdiction varies parcel by parcel depending on factors invisible to an outside observer, including the owner’s identity and the
land’s legal tenure status.”).
69. Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962)
(discussing the jurisdictional problems caused by the “impractical pattern of checkerboard
jurisdiction”); Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah v. Myton, 835 F.3d 1255, 1262 (10th Cir.
2016) (noting the jurisdictional difficulties arising from “‘checkerboard’ jurisdiction”); Hydro Res., Inc. v. USEPA, 608 F.3d 1131, 1135–36 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The land at issue in this
case lies in what is commonly known as the ‘checkerboard’ region of northwestern New
Mexico. . . . And a checkerboard it is, marked by alternating parcels of land owned by the
state, the federal government, the Navajo Nation, individual Navajos, and private persons
and entities.”) (internal citations omitted).
70. DeCouteau v. Dist. Cnty. Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 467 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

SPRING 2021]

White Tape and Indian Wards

575

71

an country are common, and land status disputes can take years
72
to resolve.
The bulk of the regulatory trouble lies with trust land. Trust
73
land is not freely alienable, so those who wish to use trust land
74
must lease it. Since the federal government holds title to trust
75
land, obtaining a lease on trust land is an adventure in federal
bureaucracy. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) has designed spe76
cific regulations for business leases. A business lease on trust land
cannot take place without the BIA’s approval. 77
To obtain the BIA’s approval for a business lease on trust land, a
company must provide a litany of documents including archeological and environmental “reports, surveys, and site assessments” that
78
apply to federal and tribal land as well as “a restoration and rec79
lamation plan.” Business leases must also contain a clause requiring the company to immediately cease activity if a previously un80
known cultural item is discovered on the leased property. If a
business lease includes permanent improvements, the lease must
specify the location and type of improvement in addition to a con81
struction schedule. An enterprise that fails to complete a permanent improvement within the specified time is required to explain

71. Land Tenure Issues, INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUND., https://iltf.org/land-issues/issues
[https://perma.cc/BBD2-VYAT] (“Jurisdictional challenges are common on checkerboard
reservations, as different governing authorities – county, state, federal, and tribal governments for example – claim the authority to regulate, tax, or perform various activities
within reservation borders.”).
72. See, e.g., Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 903 (10th Cir. 2017), aff’d sub. nom, Sharp v.
Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (mem.) (2020); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Royal v.
Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2018) (No. 17-1107), 2018 WL 776368, at *12 (“On August 28,
1999, Patrick Murphy mutilated and murdered his girlfriend’s former lover, a man named
George Jacobs.”) The only issue in Murphy was whether the land qualified as Indian country.
73. Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT. RES. J. 317, 363
(2006) (noting conventional mortgages are not available on trust land due to constraints on
alienation); Stacy L. Leeds, Moving Toward Exclusive Tribal Autonomy over Lands and Natural
Resources, 46 NAT. RES. J. 439, 445 (2006) (“Lands that are held in trust are subject to federal
restraints against alienation and encumbrances.”).
74. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFS., DIV. OF REAL ESTATE SERV.,
PROCEDURAL HANDBOOK: LEASING AND PERMITTING CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL INFORMATION 2
(2006),
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/raca/handbook/pdf/
Procedural-HB-Leasing-and-Permitting_Chapter-1-General-Information_OIMT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9KNH-F6UN] (“While there is no statutory requirement that Indian
lands held in trust by the U.S. Government be leased, the Secretary of the Interior has a fiduciary obligation to ‘protect and preserve Indian trust assets from loss, damage, unlawful
alienation, waste, and depletion,’ and to make decisions concerning trust lands that are in
the best interest of the Indian landowner.”).
75. 25 U.S.C. §§ 5105, 5108; 42 C.J.S. Indians § 93 (2019).
76. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 162.401–.703 (2019).
77. 25 C.F.R. § 162.438 (2019).
78. Id. § 162.438(g).
79. Id. § 162.438(h).
80. Id. § 162.413(c)(4).
81. Id. §§ 162.414, 162.438(j).
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82

the cause of delay to the BIA. Leases can be amended to account
for changes of circumstances; however, the BIA must authorize the
83
amendment. The lease requirements are different for agricultur84
85
86
al, residential, and wind and solar projects. The federal leasing
87
regulations can also vary from reservation to reservation.
Obtaining a business lease is just step one. Federal regulations
require non-Indians to obtain an Indian trader license to engage
88
in business relations with Indians on a reservation. The license
89
will not be issued until the lease is obtained. To obtain a license,
prospective licensees must prove they are of good moral character,
90
have business experience, have the capital to invest, and more.
The license only applies to a single store, meaning an individual
must obtain a separate license to open the same exact enterprise at
91
different coordinates within the same reservation. In the event a
licensee wishes to sell the business to another person, the licensee
92
cannot simply transfer her license. Rather, she must get the BIA’s
approval for the transfer; otherwise, the purchaser of the business
93
must go through the hassle of getting the license on his own.
Companies operating without an Indian trader license may be shut
94
down by the BIA, and failure to obtain a license places the enterprise at risk of forfeiture of “all merchandise offered for sale to the
Indians or found in his possession.”95
The bureaucracy continues even after a licensed company opens
a store in Indian country. Within Indian country, businesses cannot engage in commerce for—or even possess—any item the Unit96
ed States has provided the Indians for their welfare. Businesses
cannot even independently set their own prices, as the Code of
Federal Regulations declares:
It is the duty of the superintendent to see that the prices
charged by licensed traders are fair and reasonable. To this
end the traders shall on request submit to the superinten-

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. § 162.417(a).
Id. § 162.447.
Id. §§ 162.101–.256.
Id. §§ 162.301–.374.
Id. §§ 162.501–.599.
Id. §§ 162.600–.703.
Id. §§ 262-264, 140.1–.26.
Id. § 140.11.
Id. § 140.9.
Id. § 140.14.
Id. § 140.15.
See id.
Id. § 140.13.
Id. § 264, § 140.3.
Id. § 140.16.
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dent or inspecting officials the original invoice, showing
cost, together with a statement of transportation charges,
retail price of articles sold by them, the amount of Indian
accounts carried on their books, the total annual sales, the
value of buildings, livestock owned on reservation, the
number of employees, and any other business information
such officials may desire. The quality of all articles kept on
sale must be good and merchantable.97
Establishments operated by licensed traders “must be managed by
the bonded principal” who is a habitual resident of the reservation
98
where the business is located. The Indian trader regulations even
99
limit the methods by which traders can pay Indians and grant the
President authority to block goods from entering Indian reserva100
tions. Like the Indian country leasing regulations, different fed101
eral Indian trader regulations apply to different reservations.
As with trust land, whether a person is Indian impacts how Indian trader laws apply. “Full blood” Indians are exempt from Indian
102
trader license requirements. Only individuals who are not “pure
Indian” must obtain the license to conduct business with Indians
on a reservation. 103 Race is an overt factor for employees of Indian
traders too, as the law states “[t]hat no white person shall be employed as a clerk by any Indian trader, except such as trade with
said Five Civilized Tribes, unless first licensed so to do by the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, under and in conformity to regulations to be established by the Secretary of the Interior.”104 The law
does not define “white person,” leaving unanswered: Who is a
“white person”? 105

97. Id. § 140.22.
98. Id. § 140.14.
99. Id. § 140.24.
100. Id. §§ 263, 140.2.
101. Id. §§ 140.1, 140.3, 264.
102. Id. §§ 264, 140.3.
103. Id.
104. Id.; Id. § 140.3 (“That no white person shall be employed as a clerk by any Indian
trader, except as such trade with said Five Civilized Tribes, unless first authorized so to do by
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.”).
105. The United States has a dubious history of defining “white person.” See Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 5 n.4 (1967) (“For the purpose of this chapter, the term ‘white person’
shall apply only to such person as has no trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian;
but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and have no
other non-Caucasic blood shall be deemed to be white persons. All laws heretofore passed
and now in effect regarding the intermarriage of white and colored persons shall apply to
marriages prohibited by this chapter.”); United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204,
214–15 (1923) (“What we now hold is that the words ‘free white persons’ are words of common speech, to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common man,
synonymous with the word ‘Caucasian’ only as that word is popularly understood.”).
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These federal regulations make starting a business in Indian
country much more difficult than opening a business outside of
106
Indian country. These regulations needlessly increase transaction
costs, adding uncertainty and expense to Indian country com107
merce. These regulations—that apply only to Indian country—
108
are crippling reservation economies. Accordingly, these regulations should be challenged in court as unconstitutional impediments to tribal economic development. The following Part examines the unique constitutional position of Indians.
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON
TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Overturning legislation in the field of Indian affairs has been
109
nearly impossible because Congress is said to have plenary power
110
over Indian affairs. Plenary power over Indian affairs is not sup-

106. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 81(b) (requiring the Secretary of the Interior’s approval prior to
leasing lands for seven years or more); see also 116 AM. JUR. TRIALS 395 §14 (2010) (“Indeed,
Interior Secretary approval is needed if an Indian tribe is one of the contracting parties and
the contract is ‘relative to’ Indian lands.”); 25 U.S.C. § 177 (arguably prevents tribes from
transferring fee lands without federal approval); Mark A. Jarboe & Daniel B. Watts, Can Indian Tribes Sell or Encumber Their Fee Lands Without Federal Approval?, 0 AM. INDIAN L.J. 10
(2012).
107. See, e.g., Lucas Downey, Transaction Costs, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 19, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/transactioncosts.asp
[https://perma.cc/C599XL3E] (“When transaction costs diminish, an economy becomes more efficient, and more
capital and labor are freed to produce wealth.”); Reduce Transaction Costs In Your Small Business, NASDAQ (Feb. 1, 2017, 10:06 AM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/reducetransaction-costs-your-small-business-2017-02-01 [https://perma.cc/NKA2-ZQT9] (“Any
business that can reduce its transaction costs has a better chance of being profitable.”);
Transaction Costs Theory, SCIENCEDIRECT, https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/economicseconometrics-and-finance/transaction-costs-theory [https://perma.cc/L529-4YNR].
108. Shoemaker, supra note 68, at 490–91.
109. Gregory H. Bigler, Traditional Jurisprudence and Protection of Our Society: A Jurisgenerative Tail, 43 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 45 (2018) (“This is most particularly exemplified by the
plenary power that allows Congress to take actions towards tribes, such as termination of
their tribal status, without risk of the actions being found unconstitutional. This is because
the federal-tribal relationship is political in nature and thus not reviewable by the federal
courts.”); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132
U. PENN. L. REV. 195, 195 n.1 (1984) (“In only one case did the Court invalidate a congressional law as violating Indian property rights, but it was careful to distinguish earlier cases by
stressing that the rights at issue were individual and not tribal property rights.”).
110. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998) (“Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs, including the power to modify or eliminate tribal
rights.”); Cotton Petrol. Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he central
function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”); Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima
Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979) (“It is well established that Congress, in the exercise of its
plenary power over Indian affairs, may restrict the retained sovereign powers of the Indian
tribes.”).
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111

ported by the text of the Constitution; rather, the plenary power
doctrine is predicated on the belief in Indian racial and cultural
112
inferiority. Federal laws pertaining to Indian economic activity
are permitted by the plain text of the Constitution’s Commerce
113
Clause, however. This would seem to make all laws relating to
Indian commerce constitutional. Not so. The Fifth Amendment
114
contains a Due Process Clause. Due process prohibits the gov115
ernment from passing arbitrary laws, and the Fifth Amendment

111. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1015 (2015)
(“Both the exclusive and plenary power doctrines rest on unstable foundations. When the
Court first enunciated the plenary power doctrine in 1886, it considered, and rejected, the
Indian Commerce Clause as the doctrine’s source. Since then, many scholars have questioned whether the Clause could be read to grant the federal government unbridled power
to regulate tribes’ internal affairs.”); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81
MINN. L. REV. 31, 35 (1996) (“Kagama was the first case in which the Supreme Court essentially embraced the doctrine that Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs. Its apparent inconsistency with the most fundamental of constitutional principles[—]the McCulloch
understanding that Congress ordinarily possesses only that authority delegated to it in the
Constitution[—]is an embarrassment of constitutional theory. Its slipshod method of bootstrapping a congressional plenary power over Indian affairs is an embarrassment of logic. Its
holding, which intimates that congressional power over Indian affairs is limitless, is an embarrassment of humanity.”); Newton, supra note 109, at 196 (“The judiciary’s frequent invocation of federal plenary power over Indian affairs is curious since the Constitution does not
explicitly grant the federal government a general power to regulate Indian affairs.”).
112. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968–69 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[U]ntil the Court rejects the fiction that Congress possesses plenary power over Indian
affairs, our precedents will continue to be based on the paternalistic theory that Congress
must assume all-encompassing control over the ‘remnants of a race’ for its own good.”);
FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE CONSTITUTION
46 (2009) (“Plenary authority in Indian affairs is not rooted in the text or history of the
Constitution but in the text and history of colonialism—a colonialism in which a ‘conquered
people’ only has authority at the ‘sufferance’ of the ‘conqueror.’ ”); WILLIAMS, supra note
23, at 72 (“Significantly, the plenary power doctrine was generated directly out of the principles of white racial superiority affirmed by the Marshall model’s originating precedents in
a series of major nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions that followed the Marshall
Trilogy.”); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 113, 163 (2002) (“Indeed, this section demonstrates how the so-called federal Indian
plenary power doctrine under which Congress claims complete, virtually unlimited, legislative control over any matter involving Indians, including the very continued existence of the
Indian tribes, merely constitutes a racist American relic of ‘white man’s burden’ arguments
employed to justify American colonialism.”); Newton, supra note 109, at 236 (“[A]n important rationale for the Plenary Power Doctrine was the perceived racial and cultural inferiority of Indians.”).
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”).
115. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.”); Murray’s Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856) (“But is it ‘due process of law’? The constitution contains no description of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it be due process. It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to
enact any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative as well
as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to
leave congress free to make any process ‘due process of law,’ by its mere will.”).
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has been interpreted as mandating equal protection of the law.
Towards this end, legislation must have a logical relationship to the
117
furthering of a legitimate governmental purpose.
Based upon the classification made in a law, the Supreme Court
applies different levels of scrutiny to determine whether the law is
118
constitutional. Laws involving racial classifications result in the
courts applying a heightened standard of scrutiny; that is, racebased legislation must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
119
government interest. Laws that treat females differently than
males are subjected to intermediate scrutiny, meaning the genderbased classifications must further a substantial governmental inter120
est. Rational basis review is the lowest level of scrutiny and only
requires that laws have some conceivable connection to a valid
121
governmental objective. When used in legislation, the term Indian is not usually a racial classification. Rather, Indian is used in

116. Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 75 n.1 (1977); Substantive Due Process,
LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/
amendment-5/substantive-due-process [https://perma.cc/FB7T-2CD6].
117. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting ) (“All other liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to a validly enacted state law if that law
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)
(“Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.”); New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“Unless a classification trammels
fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race,
religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.”).
118. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“In considering whether state legislation
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST., amend.
XIV, § 1, we apply different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications.”); R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 228 (2002) (discussing “[t]he three main standards of review . . . ”);
Desiree Palomares, The Fallacy of the Intermediate Scrutiny Analysis, DENV. L. REV. ONLINE
(2019), https://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-online-article/the-fallacy-of-the-intermediatescrutiny-analysis [https://perma.cc/7YDF-T48N] (“In cases alleging discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has outlined three different levels of scrutiny for courts to employ depending on the nature of the classification: strict, intermediate,
and rational basis.”).
119. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“We have held that all racial classifications imposed by government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’ This means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
to further compelling governmental interests.”) (internal citation omitted); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“Accordingly, we hold today that all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests.”); GOV. DISCRIMINATION Tier III: Strict Scrutiny: The Compelling State Interest Test §
4:27 (West 2021).
120. 16B AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 861.
121. Id. § 858.
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connection with tribal citizenship, so Indian classifications receive
122
the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny: rational basis review.
Indians occupy an anomalous position in the constitutional
landscape. Indian tribal governments existed long before Europe123
an contact, and Europeans recognized the inherent sovereignty
124
of tribal governments by entreating with Indian tribes. The
Founding Fathers recognized tribal sovereignty as well, memorial125
izing it in the Articles of Confederation, the Northwest Ordi126
nance, and twice in the Constitution itself. 127 This distinction,
along with a potent dose of racism, resulted in tribes being denot128
ed “domestic dependent nations” in 1831, a position tribes still
129
occupy.
Even if “dependent nations,” Indians have long been regarded
130
as separate peoples. Tribes entered into “hundreds of treaties”
131
with the United States, and the Founding Fathers denoted treaties as the mechanism for transacting foreign relations in the Con-

122. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (“As long as the special treatment can
be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians, such
legislative judgments will not be disturbed.”).
123. McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (“It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and
that their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government.”); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542–43 (1832) (“America, separated from Europe by a wide
ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of
each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing
themselves by their own laws.”).
124. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND
THE AMERICAN INDIANS 7 (1984) (“It is in the treaties that one sees best the acceptance by
Europeans of the nationhood of the Indian groups that became a fixed principle in the national policy of the United States.”).
125. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. IX, para. 4.
126. NORTHWEST TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT, ORDINANCE art. III (July 13, 1787) ( “The
utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and property
shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by
Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall, from time to time, be made, for
preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with
them.”).
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
128. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
129. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2016); Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014); Quinault Indian Nation v. Pearson, 868 F.3d 1093,
1096 (9th Cir. 2017).
130. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment and Native American Citizenship, 17
CONST. COMMENT. 555, 556 (2000) (“Native Americans were considered to be members of
an alien, uncivilized race, whose values were antithetical to those of the dominant white civilization. Conversely, many Native Americans had no desire to become a part of white society,
or to be subject to the rules of that society.”).
131. Rory Taylor, 6 Native Leaders on What It Would Look Like if the US Kept Its Promises,
VOX (Sept. 23, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/first-person/2019/9/23/20872713/
native-american-indian-treaties.
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stitution. Indians’ status as distinct peoples was confirmed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, which made all persons born within the
133
United States citizens of the nation—except for Indians. The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment reveals that its language was engineered to recognize tribal sovereignty and the
134
United States’ moral duty to tribes. Due to tribes’ sovereign status, the Supreme Court held in 1881 that Indians could only ac135
quire U.S. citizenship through a statute or treaty. All Indians
136
were granted U.S. citizenship in 1924.
U.S. citizenship, nonetheless, did not impair the distinctive
137
rights Indians possess. Federally recognized Indian tribes maintain a direct government-to-government relationship with the
138
United States. This means individual Indians are citizens of their
139
140
141
tribe —not mere members of a club or corporation. Accordingly, Indians have rights as tribal citizens that remain intact unless
expressly abrogated by Congress and require compensation upon

132. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (“They
are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign
and sovereign”); Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 93, 98 (2014)
(“The treaty power is a carefully devised mechanism for the federal government to enter
into agreements with foreign nations.”).
133. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 103 (1884) (“Such Indians, then, not being citizens by
birth, can only become citizens in the second way mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment, by being ‘naturalized in the United States,’ by or under some treaty or statute.”).
134. Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1165, 1197 (2010) (“The written Constitution, while far from unambiguous, provides
textual support for this special relationship and the distinctive status of native peoples under
the Fourteenth Amendment. The proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment, moreover,
recognized the political status of tribes in the American constitutional system, the consistency of this status with the Fourteenth Amendment, and the legal and moral obligations
placed on the federal government as a result.”).
135. Elk, 112 U.S. at 103 (“Such Indians, then, not being citizens by birth, can only become citizens in the second way mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment, by being ‘naturalized in the United States,’ by or under some treaty or statute.”).
136. H.R. Res. 6355, 68th Cong., Ch. 233 (1924) (enacted).
137. Id. (“Provided, That the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner impair
or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property.” (emphasis in original)).
138. Exec. Order No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
139. Adam Crepelle, Standing Rock in the Swamp: Oil, the Environment, and the United Houma Nation’s Struggle for Federal Recognition, 64 LOYOLA L. REV. 141, 148 (2018); K.W. James,
Tribal Citizenship: A Primer, DARTMOUTH REV. (May 1, 2019), http://dartreview.com/tribalcitizenship-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/HUQ4-J2QQ]; Abi Fain & Mary Kathryn Nagle,
Close to Zero: The Reliance on Minimum Blood Quantum Requirements to Eliminate Tribal Citizenship
in the Allotment Acts and the Post-Adoptive Couple Challenges to the Constitutionality of ICWA, 43
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 801, 871 (2017) (“Thus, for ICWA to apply, either the child must
already be an enrolled citizen at the time of the state proceedings or the child’s parent must
be an enrolled citizen and the child herself must be eligible for citizenship under her
Tribe’s unique citizenship requirements.”).
140. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (“Indian tribes within ‘Indian
country’ are a good deal more than ‘private, voluntary organizations . . . .”).
141. 43 U.S.C. § 1606.
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142

termination. Legislation singling out Indians will survive constitutional scrutiny as long as the law is “reasonably and directly relat143
ed to a legitimate, nonracially based goal” Moreover, the Court
has stated that legislation must “be tied rationally to the fulfillment
144
of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.” Furthering
tribal self-determination satisfies this criterion. Bureaucracy for bureaucracy’s sake does not. The next Part explains why Indian trader laws and federal restrictions on trust land use are unconstitutional impediments to tribal self-government.
IV. CUTTING THE WHITE TAPE
Many of the contemporary laws dealing with Indians were enacted over a century ago on the grounds of Indian incompetence.145
As a result of this belief, Indians remain subject to more federal
146
laws than other U.S. citizens. Many of these laws do little more
than complicate life for Indians. Indian trader laws and tribal trust
land fall into this category.
The Olympic-level bureaucratic obstacle course created by trust
land and Indian trader laws is rooted in racism and serves no purpose other than to strangle the red man in white tape. These restrictions impede tribal economic development and undermine
tribal sovereignty. Accordingly, these laws should be challenged on

142. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968) (“We decline to construe the Termination Act as a backhanded way of abrogating the hunting and fishing rights
of these Indians.”); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 415 n.29 (1980) (“The principles we set forth today are applicable only to instances in which ‘Congress by treaty or other agreement has declared that thereafter Indians were to hold the lands permanently.’ In
such instances, ‘compensation must be paid for subsequent taking.’ ”) (internal citations
omitted).
143. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
144. Id. at 555.
145. Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 163 (1980) (“In 1790, Congress
passed a statute regulating the licensing of Indian traders. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat.
137. Ever since that time, the Federal Government has comprehensively regulated trade
with Indians to prevent ‘fraud and imposition’ upon them.”); Keeble v. United States, 412
U.S. 205, 210 (1973) (noting the Major Crimes Act “reflected a view that tribal remedies
were either non-existent or incompatible with principles that Congress thought should be
controlling.”); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 722 (1983) (“Congress imposed complete prohibition by 1832, and these prohibitions are still in effect subject to suspension conditioned
on compliance with state law and tribal ordinances.”).
146. Cohen, supra note 13, at 352 (“But these rights are limited, in practice, by more
than 2200 regulations now in force issued by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.”);
STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE
TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS 4 (3d. ed. 2002) (“No other ethnic or cultural group is so
heavily regulated.”); Naomi Schaefer Riley, One Way to Help Native Americans: Property Rights,
THE ATLANTIC (July 30, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/
native-americans-property-rights/492941 [https://perma.cc/5E9L-QQEB] (“ ‘We are the
highest regulated race in the world,’ said Stewart.”).
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constitutional grounds because they are irrational and serve no valid government purpose.
A. Trust Land Is Racist and Furthers No Purpose in Its
Current Form
Racism has played a significant role in United States-Indian relations, and nowhere is this more obvious than the “trust relationship.” The trust relationship has been repeatedly recognized by all
147
three branches of the federal government. What the federal government fails to mention is that the trust relationship is overtly
148
predicated on notions of Indian inferiority. In fact, the trust relationship is little more than a euphemistic rephrasing of Chief Justice John Marshall’s pronouncement that the relationship between
Indian tribes and the United States “resembles that of a ward to his
149
guardian.”
Contemporary Indian trust land can be traced to the 1823 deci150
sion of Johnson v. M’Intosh. In this case, the Court held that Indian tribes lost ownership of their land when Europeans arrived on
the continent; however, the Indians maintained the right to occupy their land. 151 The Court reached this conclusion by resorting to
147. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 192 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“Our decisions over the past century have repeatedly reaffirmed this ‘distinctive
obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government’ in its dealings with Indians. Congress,
too, has recognized the general trust relationship between the United States and Indian
tribes. Indeed, ‘[n]early every piece of modern legislation dealing with Indian tribes contains a statement reaffirming the trust relationship between tribes and the federal government.’ ”) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
148. See, e.g., Mary C. Wood, Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and Resources Through Claims of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355, 358
(2013) (“Judges, attorneys, and scholars often describe the trust duty of protection as a
principle deriving from a guardian-ward relationship between the federal government and
tribes.”); see also Heather Whitney-Williams & Hillary M. Hoffmann, Fracking in Indian Country: The Federal Trust Relationship, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Beneficial Use of Produced Water, 32
YALE J. ON REG. 451, 474 (2015) (“The guardian/ward relationship established in Kagama
has evolved, not in substance, but in form, into what the Supreme Court refers to as a “trust”
relationship between the federal government, as trustee, and the tribes, as beneficiaries.”);
Janice Aitken, The Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law: A Look at Its Development and at How Its
Analysis Under Social Contract Theory Might Expand Its Scope, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 115, 115-16
(1997) (“The ‘trust doctrine’ is rooted in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinions in the “Cherokee
Cases,” Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia, where he described the
relation of the Indian tribes to the United States as resembling ‘that of a ward to his guardian.’ ”).
149. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); Federal Trust Responsibility,
FEMA, [https://perma.cc/UED2-SRJ3] (noting the trust relationship “was first discussed by
Chief Justice John Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831)”).
150. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
151. Id. at 574 (“While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives,
as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in
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152

the Doctrine of Discovery, a doctrine of international law that authorizes the subjugation of non-Christian Europeans at the hands
153
of Christian kingdoms. Chief Justice Marshall stated that the Indians’ “character and religion” justified the “superior genius of Eu154
rope” claiming control of all lands in the Americas. Despite factual errors and patently racist language, Johnson v. M’Intosh remains
155
binding precedent.
The General Allotment Act of 1887 was designed to destroy Indian culture by erasing Indian reservations and forcing Indians into the U.S. mainstream. 156 Under the Act, each head of household
received 160 acres of fee land that was placed in trust for twentyfive years. 157 At the end of the period, the theory was that Indians
would become farmers like their white counterparts and own the
land outright in fee simple. 158 None of this came to bear, and this
was no surprise. The legislative history of the Allotment Act reveals
the bill’s authors intended the law to be a transfer of Indian lands
to whites. 159
possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all, to convey a title to the
grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.”).
152. Id. at 572 (“This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by whose
subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which
title might be consummated by possession.”).
153. Robert J. Miller, American Indians, the Doctrine of Discovery, and Manifest Destiny, 11
WYO. L. REV. 329, 330–31 (2011) (“The English colonists in North America and then the
American colonial, state, and federal governments all utilized the Doctrine and its religious,
cultural, and racial ideas of superiority over Native Americans to stake legal claims to the
lands and property rights of the indigenous peoples.”); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on
the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 672 (“For five hundred years, this doctrine and its discourse of diminished indigenous legal status and rights has been relied on by European and
European-derived settler states to regulate and legitimate their colonial activities in indigenous peoples’ territories.”).
154. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
155. ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS
JEFFERSON, LEWIS AND CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY 54 (Bruce E. Johansen ed., 2006)
(“The federal courts have continued to follow the precedent of Johnson v. M’Intosh, and have
enforced the Doctrine of Discovery against the Indian Nations and the states . . .”); see also,
e.g., City of Sherill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 n.1 (2005).
156. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 544 n.5 (1980); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S.
481, 496 (1973); Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1901),
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1901/message-of-the-president [https://
perma.cc/4EQJ-77VD].
157. Frank Pommersheim, Land into Trust: An Inquiry into Law, Policy, and History, 49
IDAHO L. REV. 519, 521 (2013).
158. Id. at 521–22; see also South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 335–36
(1998) (“Within a generation or two, it was thought, the tribes would dissolve, their reservations would disappear, and individual Indians would be absorbed into the larger community
of white settlers.”); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 496 (1973) (“Unallotted lands were made
available to non-Indians with the purpose, in part, of promoting interaction between the
races and of encouraging Indians to adopt white ways.”).
159. H.R. REP. NO. 46-1576, at 10 (1880) (“The real aim of this bill is to get at the Indian
lands and open them up to settlement. The provisions for the apparent benefit of the Indians are but the pretext to get at the lands and occupy them . . . . If this were done in the
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Allotment proved to be an unmitigated disaster for Indians.
Agricultural implements were supposed to accompany allotments;
however, the United States failed to deliver on this promise, making it quite difficult for poor Indians to become farmers. 161 Furthermore, the majority of land the Indians were allotted was unsuitable for farming. 162 The valuable land went to whites. 163 In total,
Indians lost ninety million acres of their treaty-guaranteed land
through the General Allotment Act. 164 A government report published four decades after the Allotment Act found that all the Act
did was cast Indians into tremendous economic despair. 165
Race played a vital role in the United States’ Indian land policy
as elucidated in 1906 legislation. The Clapp Amendment removed
land restrictions on “mixed blood” Indians of the White Earth Reservation but kept “full blood” Indians of the White Earth Reservation under federal wardship until “the Secretary of the Interior

name of greed it would be bad enough; but to do it in the name of humanity, and under the
cloak of an ardent desire to promote the Indian’s welfare by making him like ourselves
whether he will or not is infinitely worse.”).
160. Pommersheim, supra note 157, at 522 (“The results were truly devastating.”); Hodel
v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987) (“The policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved
disastrous for the Indians.”); Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 276 (1992) (“Allotment and the subsequent sale or lease of Indian lands
accomplished what the ‘genocide’ of epidemics, war, and bootlegged alcohol had not been
able to do: a systematic ‘ethnocide’ brought about by a loss of Indian identity with the loss of
land.”).
161. Pommersheim, supra note 157, at 522 (“It was grossly undercapitalized, sometimes
providing less than ten dollars per allottee for implements, seeds, and instructions.”); DAVID
H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR. & MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 198 (7th ed. 2016) (“It was not true that the
Government made no efforts whatever to equip the Indians for farming. But it made very
slight efforts.”); Stephen J. Gunn, Indian General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) (1887),
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacstranscripts-and-maps/indian-general-allotment-act-dawes-act-1887 [https://perma.cc/SE94LP8X] (last updated Feb. 18, 2020) (“The government made only minimal efforts to provide
farming equipment to the indigenous peoples. Its annual appropriations for that purpose
were often no more than $10.00 per Native.”); Native American Agriculture, ENCYCLOPEDIA
GREAT PLAINS, http://plainshumanities.unl.edu/encyclopedia/doc/egp.ag.052 [https://
perma.cc/3XLQ-Q5RM] (noting the United States failed to provide resources in order to
give Indians the opportunity to become successful farmers on their allotments).
162. WILLIAM CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 23 (6th ed. 2014); Crepelle & Block, supra note 4, at 322 (noting that much of the lands tribes retained after allotment was “unsuitable for farming.”); Gunn, supra note 161 (“Most allotted lands were not
suitable for agriculture.”).
163. See Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of
Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1557, 1609–10 (2001), https://scholarship.
law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1879&context=vlr [https://perma.cc/7N4X25M2] (“Reservations receiving more rain, with more land suitable for commercial farming,
and located nearer white population centers were allotted first, making much of their land
immediately available to white farmers and homesteaders.”).
164. CANBY, supra note 162, at 24; Pommersheim, supra note 157, at 522; Land Tenure
Issues, supra note 71.
165. THE INST. FOR GOV’T RSCH., supra note 39, at 3 (“An overwhelming majority of the
Indians are poor, even extremely poor . . . .”).
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[was] satisfied that said adult full-blood Indians are competent to
166
handle their own affairs.” Congress also forbade citizens of the
Five Civilized Tribes who were “full-blood Indian” from conducting
any land transaction on their allotments without congressional approval. 167 And, through the Burke Act, the twenty-five-year trust period could be discarded if the Indian allottee was deemed “competent” as determined by a federal “competency commission.”168 One
of the mechanisms used to measure competency was degree of Indian blood; in fact, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior adopted a
policy that Indians with “less than one-half Indian blood” were presumed to be competent. 169 Contrarily, “all adult Indians of one-half
or more Indian blood” could only be found competent “after careful investigation.” 170
Allotment and its assimilationist ideology ended in 1934 with
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). 171 Allotment was
predicated on the notion that Indian tribes should vanish, whereas
the IRA was premised on the belief that tribes should exist. 172
Hence, the IRA authorized the restoration and expansion of tribal
lands. 173 In passing the IRA, the United States acknowledged that
the nation’s prior Indian policies had been patronizing and demeaning and had devastatingly deleterious effects on Indians.174

166. United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 234 U.S. 245, 257 (1914).
167. Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 302 n.1 (1911) (quoting from the statute “That
no full-blood Indian of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek or Seminole tribes shall
have power to alienate, sell, dispose of, or encumber in any manner any of the lands allotted
to him for a period of twenty-five years from and after the passage and approval of this act,
unless such restriction shall, prior to the expiration of said period, be removed by act of
Congress.”).
168. Pommersheim, supra note 157, at 521–22.
169. Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317, 1322 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting “A Declaration of
Policy” from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs) (“To all able-bodied adult Indians of less
than one-half Indian blood; there will be given as far as may be under the law full and complete control of all their property.”).
170. Id. (“Patents in fee shall be issued to all adult Indians of one-half or more Indian
blood who may, after careful investigation, be found competent, provided, that where
deemed advisable patents in fee shall be withheld for not to exceed 40 acres as a home.”).
171. Wheeler-Howard Act of 1934 § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (current version at 25 U.S.C.S. §
5101 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-220)); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S.
329, 339–40 (1998) (“Although formally repudiated with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S C. § 461, the policy favoring assimilation of Indian
tribes through the allotment of reservation land left behind a lasting legacy.”).
172. Crepelle, supra note 3, at 437 (“The IRA was predicated on the theory that tribes
should exist.”); see Gover, supra note 73, at 329 (“A reform movement, led by John Collier,
originated outside of government in the 1920s with the rise of reformers who thought that
Indian tribal existence should not be destroyed.”).
173. Wheeler-Howard Act, ch. 576, §§ 1, 3, 48 Stat. 984 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §
5103(a)).
174. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 (1974) (“Congress in 1934 determined
that proper fulfillment of its trust required turning over to the Indians a greater control of
their own destinies. The overly paternalistic approach of prior years had proved both exploitative and destructive of Indian interests.”).
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The Supreme Court has described the IRA’s purpose as “to rehabilitate the Indian’s economic life and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism.” 175 Though the IRA is not without flaws, 176 it is
undoubtedly positive legislation for tribes. Nonetheless, a superabundance of federal regulations remain on tribal lands. 177
The gobs of land regulations that apply nowhere else but Indian
country are irrational and serve no legitimate purpose. Trust land
came into existence because Indians were deemed racially inferior
and consequently incompetent to own their land. 178 This bigoted
belief remains the cornerstone of Indian trust land. 179 Today, Indians are still required to prove competency in order to liberate their
land from trust status, 180 and degree of Indian blood remains a factor when an Indian seeks to liberate her land from the federal trust
relationship. 181 The federal government’s application of Indian
blood rather than citizenship in a federally recognized tribe distinguishes it from the constitutional tribal citizenship framework.182

175. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973).
176. Crepelle, supra note 3, at 438–39; Gover, supra note 73, at 330 (noting “[t]he pervasive and intrusive administration of Indian programs by the Bureau of Indian Affairs”).
177. See supra Part II; infra Part IV.
178. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 576–77 (1823) (“Thus asserting a
right to take possession, notwithstanding the occupancy of the natives, who were heathens,
and, at the same time, admitting the prior title of any Christian people who may have made
a previous discovery.”); James Warren, A Victory for Native Americans?, THE ATLANTIC (June 7,
2010),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2010/06/a-victory-for-native
americans/57769/ [https://perma.cc/6YX2-C9YE] (“The Indians were given beneficial
ownership but the government managed the land, believing Indians couldn’t handle their
affairs.”); UNITED S. & E. TRIBES, INC., MODERNIZING THE TRUST: REDEFINING THE UNITED
STATES-TRIBAL GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP AND ADVANCING TRUST ASSET
REFORM, KEY PRINCIPLES OF INDIAN TRUST MODERNIZATION 1 (Oct. 2015), https://
www.usetinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2.E-General-Trust-ModernizationPrinciples-FINAL-10_15_15-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NGS-MFFK] (“The current trust
model is broken and based on faulty and antiquated assumptions from the 19th Century
that Indian people were incompetent to handle their own affairs and that Indian Tribes
were anachronistic and would gradually disappear.”).
179. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 357 (1998) (“The allotment era has long since ended, and its guiding philosophy has been repudiated. . . But
despite the present-day understanding of a ‘government[-]to-government relationship between the United States and each Indian tribe,’ see, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 3601, we must give effect
to Congress’ intent in passing the 1894 Act.”); see also City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 n.1 (2005) (citing the Doctrine of Discovery and relying upon it to rule
against the Oneida in a land taxation case).
180. 25 U.S.C. § 349.
181. 25 C.F.R. § 153.3(b) (2019); 25 C.F.R. § 152.9 (2019).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (“Indeed, respondents
were not subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but
because they are enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.”); Fisher v. Dist. Court of
Sixteenth Judicial Dist., 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (“The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal
Court does not derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under federal law.”); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
554 (1974).
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Thus, arguably, the restrictions on trust land should be subjected
to strict scrutiny due to their racist origins. Regardless, the federal
restrictions cannot survive under rational basis review because the
bureaucratic constraints on tribal land use are irrational.
The federal restrictions on trust land incapacitate tribal economies and frustrate tribal self-governance. Unlike the Indian employment preference that was upheld in Morton v. Mancari, 183 federal trust land regulations do not further tribal self-government.
Rather, trust land does just the opposite because trust land requires tribes to seek federal approval for nearly all activity on trust
land. 184 Federal overlordship is the antithesis of Indian selfgovernment. The bureaucratic fetters that encumber trust land
thwart virtually all efforts at Indian country economic development. 185 Studies consistently show that non-Indian fee land is significantly more productive than adjacent trust land, 186 and as additional proof of the failure of trust land, the United States has “lost”
billions of dollars from Indian trust land accounts. 187 In the true
183. Morton, 417 U.S. at 554.
184. See. e.g., United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 295 (2009) (describing the
federal regulatory scheme over coal as granting the federal government “ ‘comprehensive
control’ over Indian coal”); White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980)
(“At the outset we observe that the Federal Government’s regulation of the harvesting of
Indian timber is comprehensive. That regulation takes the form of Acts of Congress, detailed regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, and day-to-day supervision
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.”); see also Brett Robinson, Native American Trust Lands Explained, 1ST TRIBAL LENDING, https://www.1tribal.com/native-american-trust-lands/
[https://perma.cc/M23P-6JM6] (“Even though the tribes are allowed to make their own
governments, there is a limitation to how they can use the land and require federal approval
when it comes to most actions, including taking out mortgages for home, building on the
land, and renovating existing buildings.”).
185. Crepelle, supra note 3, at 443; Terry Anderson & Dominic Parker, Un-American Reservations, HOOVER INST. (Feb. 24, 2011), https://www.hoover.org/research/un-americanreservations [https://perma.cc/R34C-DHLP] (“Not only does trusteeship saddle Indian
lands with bureaucratic oversight, it prevents Indians from using their land as collateral for
borrowing.”); Crepelle & Block, supra note 4, at 326–27 (“Nothing can happen in Indian
country without the BIA’s approval.”).
186. Crepelle & Block, supra note 4, at 331 (“Similarly, private land adjacent to reservations outproduces reservation land by 30 to 90 percent because property rights are stronger
there.”); Kevin K. Washburn, What the Future Holds: The Changing Landscape of Federal Indian
Policy, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 200, 201 (2017) (“As tribal governmental powers have increased
and tribes have entered contracts to perform more federal functions, tribal governments
have proven more institutionally competent than the federal government in serving Indian
people.”); Terry Anderson & Wendy Purnell, The Bonds of Colonialism, HOOVER INST. (Apr.
26, 2019), https://www.hoover.org/research/bonds-colonialism [https://perma.cc/LYE37H7D] (“Terry Anderson and Dean Lueck find evidence that agricultural productivity on 39
western reservations was highest on fee simple lands, with individual trust lands being 30 to
40 percent less productive and tribal trust lands being 80 to 90 percent less productive.”).
187. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1089 (D.D.C. 2001) (“Concern over federal mismanagement of the IIM trust funds is not new. The General Accounting Office, Interior
Department Inspector General, and Office of Management and Budget, among others, have
all condemned the mismanagement of the IIM trust accounts over the past twenty years.”);
Sarah Tory, The Latest: Feds Pay Final Installments of $3.4 Billion Settlement to Native Americans,
HIGHCOUNTRYNEWS (Oct. 13, 2014), https://www.hcn.org/issues/46.17/feds-pay-final-
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spirit of inept federal bureaucracy, the cost of administering trust
188
land is often far more than the value of the land itself. Tribes do
not benefit when the federal government controls their land.
The federal government is terrible at managing Indian land and
resources because the United States has no incentive to behave.
Although the trust relationship between federally recognized tribes
and the United States is legally enforceable, 189 the Supreme Court
has gone to tremendous lengths to shield the federal government
from liability for even the most extreme mismanagement of Indian
resources. 190 The Supreme Court has held that a tribe cannot sue
the United States when a federal official engages in overtly corrupt
behavior to the tribe’s detriment 191 and has also ruled that tribes
cannot even access documents to determine whether the United
States has mismanaged a tribe’s resources. 192 Decrying the Supreme
Court’s refusal to hold the United States accountable for mismanaging tribal resources, Justice Sotomayor has written, “had this type
of mismanagement taken place in any other trust arrangements
such as Social Security, there would be war.” 193

installments-of-3-4-million-settlement-to-native-americans
[https://perma.cc/7QFF-93AF]
(“In 1996, Elouise Cobell, a member of Montana’s Blackfeet Tribe, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of 500,000 Native landowners. Cobell’s lawyers argued that the federal government had deprived them of at least $170 billion in mineral royalty payments on reservation land, due to over a century of mismanagement by the Indian Trust system.”).
188. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713 (1987) (“If the tract were sold (assuming the 439
owners could agree) for its estimated $8,000 value, he would be entitled to $.000418. The
administrative costs of handling this tract are estimated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs at
$17,560 annually.”); U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/RCED-92-96BR, INDIAN
PROGRAMS: PROFILE OF LAND OWNERSHIP AT 12 RESERVATIONS 24–25 (1992),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/80/78281.pdf [https://perma.cc/43DC-Q7VG] (“On the basis
of this official’s estimate, maintaining the ownership records for the 12 reservations would
cost BIA from $40 million to $50 million per year. The original estimate also suggests that
maintaining more than 620,000 Indian individual ownership interests of 2 percent or less
for the 12 reservations would cost between $24 million and $3 1 million annually.”).
189. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983) (“This Court and several other
federal courts have consistently recognized that the existence of a trust relationship between
the United States and an Indian or Indian tribe includes as a fundamental incident the right
of an injured beneficiary to sue the trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the
trust.”); United States v. White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. 465, 474 (2003) (“The 1960 Act
goes beyond a bare trust and permits a fair inference that the Government is subject to duties as a trustee and liable in damages for breach.”).
190. E.g., United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 181–82 (2011); United
States v. Navajo, 556 U.S. 287, 289 (2009); United States v. Navajo, 537 U.S. 488, 514 (2003);
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980).
191. United States v. Navajo, 556 U.S. 287, 289 (2009); United States v. Navajo, 537 U.S.
488, 514 (2003).
192. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 177 (2011) (“For that reason,
the Tribe must point to a right conferred by statute or regulation in order to obtain otherwise privileged information from the Government against its wishes.”).
193. Id. at 208 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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As a result of the Secretary of the Interior’s consistently abhorrent supervision of Indian trust land and resources, one federal
court opined:
Alas, our “modern” Interior department has time and again
demonstrated that it is a dinosaur—the morally and culturally oblivious hand-me-down of a disgracefully racist and
imperialist government that should have been buried a
century ago, the last pathetic outpost of the indifference
and anglocentrism we thought we had left behind. 194
The federal government’s totalitarian control of Indian trust land
must come to an end. Land restrictions based upon the belief that
Indians are incompetent have no place in the twenty-first century
United States. 195 Plus, the federal government has proven itself profoundly incapable of administering Indian land. The current trust
land regulations are irrational and promote no legitimate government purpose. The current federal restrictions on Indian trust
land are unconstitutional.
B. Indian Trader Regulations Do Nothing but
Complicate Tribal Business
Restrictions on non-Indians trading with Indians have been in
196
place since the founding of the American colonies. As seizing
control of Indian wealth was a primary objective of the United
197
States’ earliest Indian policy, the Constitution of the newly
194. Cobell v. Norton, 229 F.R.D. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated sub nom., Cobell v.
Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
195. Gover, supra note 73, at 318 (“The assumptions underlying the trust are invalid, and
it necessarily follows that the specifics of the trust hold little value in the making of modem
Indian policy. The trust responsibility must be modernized to meet the new reality.”).
196. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 722 (1983) (“The colonists regulated Indian liquor
trading before this Nation was formed, and Congress exercised its authority over these
transactions as early as 1802.”); United States ex rel. Keith v. Sioux Nation Shopping Ctr., 488
F. Supp. 496, 499 (D.S.D. 1980) (“Trade with Indians has been regulated in this country
since the 1600s.”); Adam Crepelle, Shooting Down Oliphant: Self-Defense as an Answer to Crime
in Indian Country, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1283, 1310 (2018) (“Fears of armed indigenous
resistance caused most of the American colonies to enact laws prohibiting the armament of
Indians.”).
197. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 686 (1965) (“Long
before that, in fact from the very first days of our Government, the Federal Government had
been permitting the Indians largely to govern themselves, free from state interference, and
had exercised through statutes and treaties a sweeping and dominant control over persons
who wished to trade with Indians and Indian tribes.”); Sidney L. Harring, The Distorted History That Gave Rise to the “So Called” Plenary Power Doctrine: The Story of United States v. Kagama
in INDIAN LAW STORIES 149–51 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011); Crepelle, supra note 3, at
423.

592

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 54:3

formed United States specifically authorized the federal govern198
ment to regulate trade with the Indian tribes. Hence, an Indian
199
trader law was amongst the first laws passed by Congress. The law
required individuals seeking to trade with Indian tribes to obtain a
200
license from the federal government. Congress enacted further
201
regulations on Indian trade during the 1800s. These laws remain
202
part of the U.S. Code, resulting in the dense regulatory scheme
203
summarized supra. Indian trader laws were, and supposedly remain, a beneficence bestowed by the federal government upon its
Indian wards to protect them from unscrupulous dealings with
204
whites.
It is time to end the racist and paternalistic Indian trader laws.
Indian trader laws allow “full blood” Indians to do business in In205
dian country without a license. Indian trader laws categorize individuals by Indian blood rather than tribal citizenship, and this
brings Indian trader laws outside of the constitutional tribal citi206
zenship framework. Likewise, the Indian trader laws overtly forbid “white persons” from serving as clerks for Indian traders with207
out a license, raising the question: Can people of African, Asian,

198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
199. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, ch. 33 § 4, 1 Stat.
137, 138 (1790) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 177).
200. Id. § 1.
201. Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 688–89 (“Existing statutes make specific restrictions on trade with the Indians, and one of them, passed in 1876 and tracing back to
comprehensive enactments of 1802 and 1834 . . . .”).
202. 25 U.S.C. §§ 261–264.
203. 25 C.F.R. §§ 140.1–.26 (2019).
204. Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 165 (1980) (“One of the fundamental purposes of these statutes and regulations— to protect Indians from becoming
victims of fraud in dealings with persons selling goods”); Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129,
136 (1922) (“The purpose of the section clearly is to protect the inexperienced, dependent
and improvident Indians from the avarice and cunning of unscrupulous men in official position and at the same time to prevent officials from being tempted, as they otherwise might
be, to speculate on that inexperience or upon the necessities and weaknesses of these
‘Wards of the Nation.’ ”); United States v. Hutto, 256 U.S. 524, 528 (1921) (“The purpose
was to protect the Indians from their own improvidence; relieve them from temptations due
to possible cupidity on the part of persons coming into contact with them as representatives
of the United States; and thus to maintain the honor and credit of the United States, rather
than to subserve its pecuniary interest.”).
205. 25 U.S.C. § 264 (“Any person other than an Indian of the full blood who shall attempt to reside in the Indian country, or on any Indian reservation, as a trader, or to introduce goods, or to trade therein, without a license . . . .”); 25 C.F.R. § 140.3 (2019).
206. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (“Indeed, respondents were not
subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but because
they are enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.”); Fisher v. Dist. Ct. of Sixteenth
Jud. Dist., 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (“The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not
derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under federal law.”); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553–54 (1974).
207. 25 U.S.C. § 264 (“That no white person shall be employed as a clerk by any Indian
trader, except such as trade with said Five Civilized Tribes, unless first licensed so to do by
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or Latin American descent serve as unlicensed clerks to Indian
traders?
In 1879, the Supreme Court answered the question, holding that
persons of African ancestry do not count as “white persons” in Indian trader laws by reasoning that “[t]he term ‘white person,’ in
the Revised Statutes, must be given the same meaning it had in the
original act of 1834.” 208 The Supreme Court openly continues to
apply the racist standards of those who enacted anti-Indian legislation over a century ago in contemporary Indian law cases. 209 Consequently, “white persons” likely means exclusively “white persons”
and allows individuals of other races to engage in trade without a
license. This probably makes sense by the bigoted standards of the
1700s and 1800s. White people were the folks swindling Indians
during these years, and persons of mixed white and Indian ancestry could have been classified as “white.” 210 This means Indian trader laws make flagrantly racial classifications and should be subjected to strict scrutiny rather than the usual rational basis review
applied to Indian legislation.
Regardless of the standard of scrutiny applied, Indian trader
laws are unconstitutional because the laws serve no rational purpose. During the early days of the United States, there was a plausibly rational basis for Indian trader regulations as linguistic and
cultural differences could have left Indians vulnerable to shady
211
dealings with whites. There is no rational basis for these laws tothe Commissioner of Indian Affairs, under and in conformity to regulations to be established by the Secretary of the Interior.”); 25 C.F.R. § 140.3 (2019).
208. United States v. Perryman, 100 U.S. 235, 236 (1879).
209. See Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 357 (1998) (“The allotment era
has long since ended, and its guiding philosophy has been repudiated. . . . But despite the
present-day understanding of a ‘government[-]to-government relationship between the
United States and each Indian tribe,’ see, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 3601, we must give effect to Congress’ intent in passing the 1894 Act.”); Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206
(1978) (“ ‘Indian law’ draws principally upon the treaties drawn and executed by the Executive Branch and legislation passed by Congress. These instruments, which beyond their actual text form the backdrop for the intricate web of judicially made Indian law, cannot be
interpreted in isolation but must be read in light of the common notions of the day and the
assumptions of those who drafted them.”).
210. Jeffrey Ostler, ‘The Last Buffalo Hunt’ and Beyond Plains Sioux Economic Strategies in the
Early Reservation Period, GREAT PLAINS Q., Spring 2001, at 123 (“The best jobs went to mixed
bloods and relatives of prominent leaders, especially those whom agents regarded as “progressive” or were trying to co-opt.”).
211. However, this position is debatable. Indians were trading effectively with Europeans
until disease, war, and the destruction of their food sources forced the Indians onto reservations. See, e.g., Yellowtail, supra note 7 (“Lewis and Clark reported to President Thomas Jefferson that native inhabitants throughout the Louisiana Territory were a thoroughly independent, businesslike lot—sharp entrepreneurs and shrewd dealers. The point to be
extracted is that American Indians never have been strangers to the American entrepreneurial spirit.”); Shane Lief, Singing, Shaking, and Parading at the Birth of New Orleans, XXVIII
JAZZ ARCHIVIST 1, 18 (2015), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287204530_
Singing_Shaking_and_Parading_at_the_Birth_of_New_Orleans
[https://perma.cc/8YAJ-
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day. The overwhelming majority of Indians speak English and un212
derstand the United States’ culture. Any justification that may
have existed for Indian trader laws has long since vanished.
The irrationality of Indian trader laws is further evinced by their
subversion of tribal economies, and this fact has been recognized
by some federal courts of appeal. It is illegal to trade with Indians
213
sans a federal license, and obtaining an Indian trader license is
ridiculously complicated. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals believed inept federal bureaucracy rendered it “impossi214
ble” to become an Indian trader on some reservations. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that enforcing Indian trader
regulations actually harms Indians by adding uncertainty to Indian
215
country business transactions. Although no one is allowed to en216
gage in business on the Navajo Nation without federal approval,
the Ninth Circuit found the operation of the Indian trader system
harms the Navajo, declaring, “The trader dominates the relationship between the Navajos and those outside the reservation to his
own economic advantage.” 217 The Ninth Circuit bluntly stated,
“The traders have a legal monopoly, since they have a captive mar4LL2] (noting Jesuit missionary Father Pierre de Charlevoix description of the Tunica Chief
he encountered in the early 1700s as “dressed in the French fashion [and] carries on trade
with the French, supplying them with horses and poultry, and is very expert at business . . . .”); Miller, supra note 3, at 788 (“Tribes and individual Indians had no problem incorporating newly arrived Europeans into their trading networks.”).
212. Lance Morgan, Ending the Curse of Trust, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY 7 (Mar. 23, 2005),
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/15%20-%20HoChunk%20Inc.pdf [https://perma.cc/9469-7LD4] (“Besides, we speak English now.”).
213. 25 U.S.C. §§ 261–264; United States v. Parton, 132 F.2d 886, 887 (4th Cir. 1943)
(“As the defendants had not been licensed to trade on the reservation, it was unlawful for
them to engage in such business . . . .”).
214. United States ex rel. Keith v. Sioux Nation Shopping Ctr., 634 F.2d 401, 403 (8th Cir.
1980) (“From the district court’s memorandum opinion it appears that bureaucratic nonfeasance makes it impossible to obtain the federal trader’s license required by section 264 in
the Pine Ridge area in South Dakota. Wayne Adkinson, Administrative Manager of the Pine
Ridge Reservation and a Department of the Interior employee, testified that he attempted to
implement the licensing program on the Reservation, but abandoned his efforts because of
the administrative difficulties and adverse public opinion that resulted. For example, his
office did not even have any of the license forms available.”).
215. See United States ex rel. Hornell v. One 1976 Chevrolet Station Wagon, 585 F.2d 978,
981 (10th Cir. 1978) (“At the time suit was brought, the subject vehicle had already been
sold to Indians living on the reservation. Plaintiffs assert, however, that ‘the formal declaration of the forfeiture relates back to the time the station wagon was offered for sale and
avoids the sale to appellants and the subsequent assignment to Merchants Bank.’ Were we to
accept this position, we would jeopardize the possessory rights of reservation Indians to purchased goods which were offered to them in contravention of § 264, since the goods would
be subject to forfeiture irrespective of a subsequent good faith purchase. Such a doctrine
would violate the spirit and intent of § 264, which was enacted for the Indians’ economic
protection. Plaintiffs’ claim of forfeiture must consequently fail.”).
216. Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 1971) (“No one is allowed to
conduct business on the reservation without the approval of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs.”).
217. Id.
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ket and need not worry about competition. They are not subject to
the controls of the free enterprise system,” and the Indian trader
system, “works to the benefit of the trader and against the Navajos.” 218
The application of Indian trader laws is also odd considering
their purpose. The laws are designed to protect “Indian wards”
from devilish dealings with non-Indians. 219 The laws, however, only
apply to transactions between non-Indians and Indians while on a
reservation. 220 If the laws are designed to protect Indians from corrupt business practices by non-Indians, shouldn’t the laws apply to
commerce involving Indians off the reservation? Presumably, Indians are easier prey for non-Indians outside of Indian country than
within it. This means that whatever justification existed for protecting Indians from non-Indians on a reservation is even stronger
when Indians leave the reservation; thus, requiring a license to
trade with Indians on a reservation but not requiring a license to
trade with Indians off the reservation makes no sense. 221
Indian trader regulations need to be erased from the books. The
laws do nothing but hurt Indians, and Indians have expressed desire to be liberated from the Indian trader system. 222 Though trad-

218. Id. at 569.
219. E.g., Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 136 (1922) (“The purpose of the section
clearly is to protect the inexperienced, dependent and improvident Indians from the avarice
and cunning of unscrupulous men in official position and at the same time to prevent officials from being tempted, as they otherwise might be, to speculate on that inexperience or
upon the necessities and weaknesses of these ‘Wards of the Nation.’ ”).
220. One 1976 Chevrolet Station Wagon, 585 F.2d at 980 (“Plaintiffs have asserted a claim
under 25 U.S.C. § 264, which is part of a statutory scheme designed to protect Indians living
on reservations from unscrupulous trade practices.”).
221. It is worth noting that tribes must distinguish between their citizens and those not
enrolled in their tribe for purposes of tax collection. Indians are exempt from state taxation
while on their reservation. Individuals not enrolled in the tribe must pay state taxes on all
purchases within a tribe’s reservation. Supreme Court precedent requires Indians to verify
the identification of every purchaser in order that the state may extract taxes from the tribe.
Presumably if incompetent Indians can distinguish between their citizens and others, states
can do the same on all purchases. Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros.,
512 U.S. 61, 73 (1994); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomie Indian Tribe of
Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 512–13 (1991); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Rsrv., 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976).
222. NAFSA Submits Comments on Indian Trader Regulations, NATIVE AM. FIN. SERV. ASS’N
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://nativefinance.org/news/nafsa-submits-comments-on-indian-traderregulations/ [https://perma.cc/2L7R-ATET]; UNITED S. & E. TRIBES, INC., REQUESTING
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TO CLARIFY THE INDIAN TRADER REGULATIONS TO ENSURE THAT
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY TAKING PLACE IN INDIAN COUNTRY GENERATES REVENUE FOR INDIAN
COUNTRY, USET SPF RES. NO. 2016:029 (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.usetinc.org
/wp-content/uploads/bvenuti/Resolutions/2016/29%20%20REQUESTING%20
ADMINISTRATIVE%20ACTION%20TO%20CLARIFY.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DFC-A8R2]
(“The development of new regulations to implement the Indian Trader Statutes by the Department of Interior to clarify that the regulation of non-Indians engaging in commerce in
Indian Country is intended to protect and promote the wellbeing of Tribal Nation communities through the preemption of state and local taxation on Tribal lands will provide a vital-
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223

ing licenses can still be obtained, it appears the license requirement is seldom enforced. 224 Aside from being seldom enforced, the
licenses may be impossible to acquire. In fact, the Administrative
Manager of the Pine Ridge Reservation gave up hope of getting
Indian trader licenses and considered “employing local high
school art students to make [Indian Trader] licenses.” 225 The very
existence of Indian trader laws leaves room for selective enforce226
ment that creates uncertainty and harms tribal economies. Even
if unenforced, the Indian trader laws are relics from eras of great
injustice to the Indians. Indians deserve better than for the government to simply ignore these vestiges of bigotry. Accordingly,
Indian trader laws should be struck down on constitutional
grounds.

ly necessary tool for promoting Tribal economic activity, job creation and sustainable nation-building in Indian Country.”); Proposal to Amend the Indian Trader Regulations to Support
Tribal Self-Determination in Business Regulation and Taxation, NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS (Dec. 8,
2016),
http://www.ncai.org/policy-issues/economic-development-commerce/Broadcast_
ANPR_on_Indian_Trader_Regs.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CTW-GVE5] (“It is long past time
to bring tribal self-determination to Indian Trade and Commerce. It is no longer necessary
for the Department of Interior to license traders on Indian reservations, and the regulations
are an anachronistic and patriarchal burden on economic development.”).
223. Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 74 n.10 (1994)
(“According to the Federal Government, there are approximately 125 federally licensed Indian traders in New York, of whom the 64 wholesalers are all non-Indians and the 61 retailers are all Indians.”); Complaint at 13, Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F. Supp. 3d 1046
(W.D. Wash. 2018) (No. 2:15-cv-00940-MAT), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2015/
06/1-complaint4.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FVE-5NHZ] (noting businesses at Quil Ceda Village must obtain Indian Trader Licenses).
224. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Jurisdiction—A Historical Bargain, 76 MD. L. REV. 101,
106 (2017), http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3746
&context=mlr [https://perma.cc/GLY7-65PG] (“Indian trader statutes are still extant,
though it is not clear if the United States continues to license traders in the twenty-first century. The Indian trader regulations are completely out of date; they refer to federal offices
that no longer exist, such as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and assume Indians will
only pay in cash.”).
225. United States ex rel. Keith v. Sioux Nation Shopping Ctr., 488 F. Supp. 496, 500
(D.S.D. 1980); see also supra note 214.
226. Emily Ekins, Myriad Vague and Selectively Enforced Laws Are Not Ideal for Economic
Growth, REASON (Aug. 9, 2012), https://reason.com/2012/08/09/myriad-vague-andselectively-enforced-la-2/ [https://perma.cc/P3ZJ-5LLM] (“Uncertainty with what laws are
on the books, how those laws are interpreted, and how they will be enforced is not the ideal
recipe for a thriving economic climate.”); Timothy Meyer, Free Trade, Fair Trade, And Selective
Enforcement, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 491, 494–95 (2018) (“I define selective enforcement in the
commercial context as the systematic enforcement of laws against some producers but not
others that (1) compete with the targets of enforcement and (2) engage in or benefit from
the same allegedly unlawful conduct.”); Will Wilkinson, “Socialism” vs. “Capitalism” Is a False
Dichotomy, VOX (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/8/16/17698602/
socialism-capitalism-false-dichotomy-kevin-williamson-column-republican-ocasio-cortez
[https://perma.cc/MJZ4-S349] (“The problem is that markets are defined by an incomprehensible jumble of regulatory kludges — an accumulation of individually reasonable but
cumulatively stifling technocratic fixes — that strangle economic freedom for ordinary people, allowing the powerful to capture the economy by writing and selectively enforcing the
rules to their advantage.”).
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V. RESPECTING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: ALLOW TRIBES TO
GOVERN THEIR LAND
When the Indian trader laws are stricken from the U.S. Code
and the federal government begins to respect tribal land rights,
true tribal self-determination can begin. Despite endorsing the
227
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
228
the United States’ Indian policy remains behind the times. The
United Nations has slammed the United States’ Indian policy as
“out of step with contemporary legal developments in indigenous
229
rights.” Similarly, the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights has decried the United States failure to honor Indian prop230
erty rights. The United States can and must do better at respect231
ing Indian rights.
The actualization of tribal autonomy is in perfect harmony with
232
the United States’ tradition of local self-government. Plus, tribes
know how to govern themselves as they have a much longer tradi233
tion of self-rule than do other American governments. Tribes
possess all the governmental powers that they have not been di234
vested of; thus, tribes should be able to operate as islands of lib227. Press Release, Dep’t of State, Announcement of U.S. Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Jan. 12, 2011), https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/154782.pdf; see also G.A. RES. 61/295 (Sept. 13,
2007),
https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-content/uploads
/sites/19/2018/11/UNDRIP_E_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK5Q-CHFY].
228. Although the United States has a long way to go when it comes to respecting tribal
sovereignty, positive changes have been made in recent years such as the Tribal Law and
Order Act of 2010, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, and the Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Home Ownership Act of 2012.
229. Comm. On the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 59th Sess. Summary of the
1475th Meeting, at ¶ 33, CERD/C/SR/1475 (Aug. 22, 2001).
230. Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶ 173 (2002).
231. See Cohen, supra note 13, at 390 (“Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the
shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians,
even more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith.”); see also FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A
POLITICAL ANOMALY 271 (quoting Secretary of Interior James Harlan in August 16, 1865:
“Other nations will judge our character by our treatment of the feeble tribes to whom we
sustain the relation of guardian”).
232. See generally Michael Hendrix, The Case for Local Government, REAL CLEAR POL’Y
(Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2019/03/04/the_case_for_local_
government_111089.html [https://perma.cc/E63R-52F6] (“Local governments are a living
tradition within the political order set out in the Constitution.”).
233. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1978); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542–43 (1832).
234. Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1228 (D. Nev.
2014) (“Congressionally recognized tribes retain all aspects of sovereignty . . . with three exceptions: (1) they may not engage in foreign commerce or foreign relations; (2) they may
not alienate fee simple title to tribal land without the permission of Congress; and (3) Congress may strip a tribe of any other aspect of sovereignty at its pleasure.”) (internal citations
omitted); Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (“Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not
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erty. That is, tribes should be free to “make their own laws and be
235
ruled by them.” Tribal law should govern tribal lands as well as all
activities occurring within tribal borders. This will allow tribes to
experiment with new policies and serve as “laboratories” of democ236
237
racy, furthering the principles of federalism.
Tribes must be given the freedom to develop and implement the
rules that apply to the lands within their borders. Likewise, the
economic regulations that apply within Indian country should be
created by tribes. The remainder of this Part discusses why Indian
country’s current federal regulatory system should be replaced by
tribal laws governing land use and commercial regulation, as this
will allow tribes to control their economies and also furthers the
U.S. policy of tribal self-determination.
A. Tribal Land Rights
Toppling the trust regime means each tribe must be free to establish its own land tenure system. Though many believe Indians
simply lived in harmony with nature and recognized no property
238
rights in land prior to 1492, this is completely false. Tribes developed a vast variety of land use systems centuries before any Euro239
pean set foot in the Americas. Agricultural tribes recognized in240
likewise, agrarian tribes recognized
dividual rights in land;
property rights in improvements to land, including crop storewithdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”); 38 JOHN A. GEBAUER, CAL. JUR. 3D Indians § 2 (“Indian tribes have a status higher than
that of states; they are subordinate and dependent nations possessed of all powers except to
the extent that they have expressly been required to surrender them by the superior sovereign, the United States.”).
235. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
236. Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 817 (2015)
(“This Court has ‘long recognized the role of the States as laboratories for devising solutions
to difficult legal problems.’ ”); New State Ice Co., v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
237. Tivas Gupta, The Future of Federalism, HARV. POL. REV. (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/the-future-of-federalism/
[https://perma.cc/
SF72-EBNZ] (“Congress allows parties to experiment with more conservative or liberal policy solutions on a state level before it would even be possible to imagine their implementation nationwide.”); Gover, supra note 73, at 335 (“Belief in the inferiority and incompetence
of Indians has finally been discredited and policy now assumes that Indian Tribes are a
permanent feature of American federalism.”).
238. Bobroff, supra note 163, at 1567 (“According to that story, tribal societies were
“communist,” recognizing no private property rights in land. Indians, the story went, were
crying out to be saved by the transformative power of private property.”).
239. Id. at 1571 (“Rather, Indian societies have had myriad different property systems,
varying widely by culture, resources, geography, and historical period.”).
240. Id. at 1573.
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241

houses and irrigation canals. Nomadic tribes typically did not
recognize individual rights to land, as land ownership is unim242
portant when a society is constantly migrating. Nevertheless, even
nomadic tribes acknowledged land rights if an individual mixed
243
her labor with the land. Tribal property systems evolved as social
244
and environmental conditions changed over the years, but the
245
current trust land tenure system kills tribes’ ability to adapt.
Control of tribal property law must be returned to tribes. This
means the trust restrictions on tribal lands must be removed, and
tribes’ inherent right to control all the lands within their borders
must be recognized. Under this proposal, tribes alone should regulate the activities that occur on tribal lands. 246 Tribes must be able
to lease and even sell their lands while perpetually maintaining
sovereignty over the land and events occurring on it. 247 Every other
jurisdiction on the planet operates under this system, 248 and having
tribal jurisdiction eternally attached to tribal land effectively pre-

241. Crepelle, supra note 3, at 418 (“Rights to land improvements, such as storehouses
for crops and access to irrigation systems, were held individually.”).
242. See Bobroff, supra note 163, at 1592 (“Generally, tribes dependent upon the buffalo
for their economy recognized no more than temporary property rights in seasonally occupied villages.”).
243. See id. at 1573 (“Societies whose members ranged over vast territories were the least
likely to recognize property rights in land, although even these tribes recognized property
rights in cultivated lands.”).
244. Id. (“Moreover, Indian property institutions, like property rules under English
common law, were able to change and adapt to meet new social and economic challenges
and conditions.”).
245. Id. at 1563 (“When it did so, allotment did more than just disable tribal property
laws. Most significant, it destroyed tribes’ power to adapt their property laws to meet new
social, economic, political, and ecological conditions.”).
246. An exception to this would be generally applicable federal laws. For example, uranium mines on tribal lands can be required to comply with generally applicable federal laws
to the same extent as uranium mines outside of Indian country. When tribes and states are
held to the same level of federal regulation, federal regulation is not as offensive to tribal
sovereignty.
247. Angelique EagleWoman (Wambdi A. WasteWin), Tribal Nations and Tribalist Economics: The Historical and Contemporary Impacts of Intergenerational Material Poverty and Cultural
Wealth Within the United States, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 805, 823–24 (2010) (“The U.S. government
must end its assertion of federal control over the tribal land base and resources by federal
recognition of tribal property systems with permanent tribal jurisdiction to regulate the land
base. This step is necessary to provide for the process of freeing up the underlying asset base
of Indian Country. Non-tribal members purchasing or leasing land within tribal jurisdictions
would be able do so with the acknowledgement that the land will continue to be permanently subject to tribal law and regulation.”); Gover, supra note 73, at 363 (“Tribes should have
the option of alienating land without thereby losing their authority over it. There are good
reasons that Tribes might choose to alienate . . .”).
248. Eaglewoman, supra note 247, at 824 (“This is the situation found in every jurisdiction around the world. For example, purchasing land in France is acquiescing to French
laws of property ownership, zoning, and regulation.”); Shoemaker, supra note 68, at 489
(“Characteristically, real property jurisdiction is territorial—meaning the law of the place
where the property is located governs. If an Iowan purchases real property in Colorado,
there is no question that Colorado governs that real property ownership.”).
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249

serves tribal land bases. Leading Indian attorney and entrepreneur Lance Morgan has proposed a similar system to “ending the
250
curse of trust.”
Under this system, each tribe will be empowered to craft land
use and ownership rules suited to its unique situation. Some tribes
may want to maintain their reservations as they currently are, so
these tribes can copy the current federal land rules. Other tribes
may wish to make their reservations more attractive to industry and
will be able to implement property rules amenable to businesses.
Similarly, tribes may wish to make their land easier to mortgage in
251
order to improve reservation housing. Several tribes also face se252
vere land fractionation issues resulting from allotment. Tribes
should be able to determine how their land passes from generation
to generation as with every other issue pertaining to their land.
To be abundantly clear, this is not a call to privatize the reserva253
tion and terminate tribal land bases; rather, this is a call to respect tribal land rights. Even in Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall stated, “It has never been contended, that the Indian title amounted
to nothing.” 254 The Supreme Court shed light on what Indian title
means twelve years later when it declared that Indian title “is considered as sacred as the fee simple of the whites” 255 and Indian
lands “could not be taken without their consent.” 256 Over the years,
the Supreme Court has reaffirmed this maxim on multiple occa-

249. Singer, supra note 27, at 34 (noting tribes support trust land because it preserves
tribal land bases).
250. See Morgan, supra note 212, at 6.
251. See David Murray, Crisis in Our Backyard: Indian Housing, GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Apr. 3,
2016, 7:50 PM), https://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/local/2016/03/31/crisisbackyard-montanas-reservation-housing/82466032/
[https://perma.cc/DBT6-MLRW];
Chris Aadland, Tribal Officials Discuss Challenges and Solutions to Addressing Reservation Housing
Crisis, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Feb. 15, 2020), https://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/tribalofficials-discuss-challenges-and-solutions-to-addressing-reservation-housing/
article_1a14e02a-f4ee-513e-8ef0-94533f89f537.html [https://perma.cc/EYH4-4AEJ]; Julian
Brave NoiseCat, America’s Forgotten Crisis: Over 50% of One Native American Tribe are Homeless,
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2017/apr/06/americas-forgotten-crisis-50-percent-native-american-tribe-homeless
[https://perma.cc/VWX5-GA4D].
252. Shoemaker, supra note 68, at 490 (“In addition, in large part because of the restrictiveness of this status, today many Indian trust properties suffer the practical realities of extreme co-ownership or fractionation, perpetuated by many generations of intestate distributions to multiple heirs and the lack of flexible inter vivos transfer options.”).
253. See David Blackmon, Trump Advisers’ Plan To ‘Privatize’ Indian Lands: Limited Potential
Gain, Heavy Political Pain, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2016, 11:14 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
davidblackmon/2016/12/06/privatization-of-indian-lands-limited-potential-gain-heavypolitical-pain/#4e7251a239e1 [https://perma.cc/3NQF-LYJE].
254. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 603 (1823).
255. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835).
256. Id.
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257

sions. Accordingly, Professor Joseph Singer has stated, “Indian
title is not a license; Indian title is full ownership of land by a sovereign Indian nation.” 258 The discombobulating federal regulations
deprive tribes of their property rights as well as their sovereignty.259
The aim of this proposal is to enhance tribal sovereignty by allowing tribes to perpetually exercise dominion over their land. Federal
control must contract in order for tribal sovereignty to expand.
As evidence that this proposal is not tribal termination part
two, 260 maintenance of current federal expenditures is called for.261
The federal government spends over a billion dollars annually to
262
manage activities on tribal land, and the federal government is
terribly inefficient with those funds. For example, the federal government spends more money managing allotments than allot263
ments are worth. The federal government should redirect the
funds it currently uses to manage trust land and resources to the
control of the tribes themselves. Allowing tribes to use federal
funds when taking over activities performed by the federal gov264
ernment has statutory precedent; plus, tribes are better at man265
aging their land and resources than are federal bureaucrats.
257. Cnty. Of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U.S. 226, 235 (1985); Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. Of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 669 (1974); United States v. Santa Fe
Pacific R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941).
258. Singer, supra note 27, at 24.
259. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One Distinction Too Many, 64
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 101 (2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/3/2012/03/64-SLRO-99.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PFU-2PAN] (“Regulatory
takings, in contrast, leave landowners in possession, but subject them to restrictions on the
ability to use, develop, or dispose of the land.”); ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 97122, TAKINGS DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 1 (2015),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-122.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2CH-U8XR] (“This critical
expansion of takings jurisprudence to ‘regulatory takings’ acknowledged that purely regulatory interferences with property rights can have economic and other consequences for
property owners as significant as appropriations and physical invasions.”).
260. Gover, supra note 73, at 333 (“Any policy initiative involving even the hint of a suggestion that the federal role in reservation land management should be reduced raises the
suspicion that the new policy is termination in disguise.”); H.R. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 67
Stat. B132 (1st Sess. 1953); Casey R. Kelly, Orwellian Language and the Politics of Tribal Termination (1953–1960), 74 W.J. COMM. 351, 351 (2010) (“[T]ermination signaled the decline of
New Deal enthusiasm for tribal sovereignty.”).
261. Actually, an increase would be ideal. Tribal governments receive far less in federal
funds than other governments. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 54.
262. See U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FY 2017 FEDERAL FUNDING FOR PROGRAMS SERVING
TRIBES AND NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (2017), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/
files/uploads/FY2017NativeAmericanCrosscut.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7WZ-PLJ9].
263. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 708 (1987).
264. See Public Law 93-638 Contracting and Compacting, OFF. SPECIAL TR. FOR AM. INDIANS,
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/ost/tribal_beneficiaries/contracting
[https://perma.cc/B7Y4-RPVY].
265. Regan, supra note 61 (“As with other forms of energy development, when tribes are
afforded more control over natural resource management, the result has been significantly
better management and higher output.”); Katie Tubb & Caleb Sutherlin, Federal Government
Continues to Give Native American Tribes a Bad Deal, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 23, 2018),
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Moreover, the United States provides states with federal funds
267
and spends billions of dollars on foreign aid. Accepting federal
funds does not make tribes wards or dependents, especially since
268
tribes have treaty rights to federal funds. This proposal intends to
recognize tribes’ inherent right to control their land and provide
tribes with the resources to do it.
B. Tribal Trade Policy
The federal Indian trader laws need to be replaced with tribal
laws. That is, tribes must be free to enact their own business regulatory schemes. Tribes do not need the federal government to approve who does business on their land or how. Tribes must be able
to craft their own business regulatory environments. Some tribes
may wish to assert heavy oversight of the businesses within their
borders, while other tribes may prefer a more laissez-faire approach. The choice should be up to the tribes and the tribes alone.
In order for tribes to implement their own business laws, tribal
jurisdiction needs to be recognized. Tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians by virtue of the Supreme Court’s decision in
269
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, a decision that relies upon extremely questionable reasoning and overtly racist jurisprudence. 270
Nevertheless, the Court has also utilized Oliphant to restrict tribal
271
civil jurisdiction. For example, in 2001, the Court denied the

https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/federal-governmentcontinues-give-native-american-tribes-bad-deal [https://perma.cc/FHU9-3Z3M] (“Tribal
lands, just like states, have shown time and again that they can do a better job at developing
the lands than the federal government.”).
266. Samuel Stebbins, How Much Money Does Your State Receive from the Federal Government?
Check Out This List, USA TODAY (Mar. 20, 2019, 8:34 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/economy/2019/03/20/how-much-federal-funding-each-state-receives-government/
39202299/ [https://perma.cc/AFB6-EKF2].
267. Foreign Aid By Country: Who Is Getting The Most—And How Much?, CONCERN
WORLDWIDE US (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.concernusa.org/story/foreign-aid-bycountry/ [https://perma.cc/8W2J-QRPY] (“Globally in 2017, the United States spent over
$46 billion in foreign aid.”).
268. Crepelle, supra note 3, at 430–31.
269. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
270. Adam Crepelle, Tribal Courts, The Violence Against Women Act, and Supplemental Jurisdiction: Expanding Tribal Court Jurisdiction to Improve Public Safety in Indian Country, 81 MONT.
L. REV. 301, 310 (2020); Crepelle, supra note 23; WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 97 (noting Oliphant “unembarrassedly perpetuates the Marshall Model’s overarching principle of white
racial supremacy contained in the European colonial-era rooted doctrine of discovery”).
271. E.g., Plains Com. Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle, Co., 544 U.S. 316, 238 (2008);
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 (2001) (relying on Oliphant for the proposition that inherent sovereign powers do not extend beyond citizens of the tribe); Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (“Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the general proposition that
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Navajo Nation the right to tax a non-Indian business operating on
a small parcel of fee land within the Navajo Nation despite the
Navajo Nation supplying essential governmental services to the
272
business. This lack of jurisdiction effectively deprives tribes of
their ability to regulate their economies.
Congress needs to reaffirm tribes’ inherent authority to regulate
273
all activities within their borders. Early Congresses recognized
that tribal regulation of Indian country commerce was more im274
portant than the Indian trader laws. Though the Court has since
275
diminished tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court
declared that tribal courts are presumed to have civil jurisdiction
276
over non-Indians as recently as 1985. In 2013, Congress acknowledged that tribes have inherent criminal jurisdiction over non277
Indians in certain circumstances. Tribal courts have treated non278
Indians fairly in criminal cases, so Congress is currently consider279
ing expanding tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. In
fact, Senators who opposed recognizing tribes’ criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians admitted that there is no logical reason to

the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”).
272. Atkinson Trading Co., Inc., v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 655 (2001) (“Although we do
not question the Navajo Nation’s ability to charge an appropriate fee for a particular service
actually rendered, we think the generalized availability of tribal services patently insufficient
to sustain the Tribe’s civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian fee land.”).
273. After European contact and well into the 1800s, tribes exercised both civil and
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians within their borders. See CANBY, supra note 161, at 149
(“In colonial days, the Indian territory was entirely the province of tribes, and they had jurisdiction in fact and theory over all persons and subjects present there.”); FLETCHER, supra
note 55, at 349 (“Moreover, federal officials were aware that the Cherokee courts asserted
jurisdiction over non-Indians, and in at least on instance in 1824 turned over an American
citizen to the Cherokees for prosecution.”); Paul Spruhan, “Indians, in a Jurisdictional Sense”:
Tribal Citizenship and Other Forms of Non-Indian Consent to Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 1 AM.
INDIAN L.J. 79 (2012) (noting Jacob West, a white man, was sentenced to hang by a Cherokee court, and the federal court refused to grant West habeas corpus in 1844); Ablavsky,
supra note 111, at 1086 n.400 (“It also ignores historical evidence suggesting that the federal
government not only permitted, but oversaw, tribal court jurisdiction exercising tribal sovereignty over non-Natives.”).
274. Fletcher, supra note 224, at 107 (“Even Congress, at times, seemed to understand
that tribal regulations were of greater import than federal Indian trader statutes, which
proved to be an ineffective means to govern Indian trade.”).
275. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001); Nevada v. Hicks, 535
U.S. 353, 360 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
276. Iowa Mut. Ins. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (“Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute.”).
277. 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
278. See, e.g., NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, VAWA 2013’S SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION FIVE-YEAR REPORT 19 (2018), http://www.ncai.org/resources/ncaipublications/SDVCJ_5_Year_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9SZ-LFC8].
279. H.R. 1585 – Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1585 [https://perma.cc/4G2YXPBD].
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limit such jurisdiction over non-Indians once it is recognized in
280
some instances. Criminal penalties are generally considered
more severe sanctions than civil penalties, so a tribe’s ability to incarcerate non-Indians should translate into the ability to hold nonIndians liable for breach of contract and other civil matters. Therefore, Congress should reaffirm tribes’ inherent authority to regulate economic activities within their borders.
The reaffirmation of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians should
include an acknowledgment of original principle, and still the pre281
sumptive rule, that state law has no force within Indian country.
282
States currently apply their laws within Indian country, and states
283
often use their authority to undermine tribal economies. In particular, state taxation of Indian country enterprise effectively deprives tribes of the ability to tax; after all, no business wants to pay
284
state and tribal taxes when just paying state taxes is an option.
State taxation, on top of the complex federal regulatory regime,
285
scares businesses away from Indian country. No businesses means
no businesses to tax, and, without tax revenue, tribes struggle to
provide the infrastructure necessary to attract businesses to Indian
286
country. Furthermore, the application of state law adds uncer287
tainty to Indian country. For example, do individuals have to
288
abide by state or tribal rules? And should individuals seek redress

280. S. REP. NO. 112–153, at 48 (2012) (“[W]hile the present bill’s jurisdiction is limited
to domestic-violence offenses, once such an extension of jurisdiction were [sic] established,
there would be no principled reason not to extend it to other offenses as well.”).
281. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (holding the laws of Georgia
“have no force” inside the Cherokee Nation); 42 C.J.S. Indians § 92 (2018) (“A state is
preempted by operation of federal law from applying its own laws to land held by the United
States in trust for the tribe.”).
282. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B-C); Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat.
280 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, and 25 U.S.C. §§
1321–1326 (1988)); Cotton Petrol. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186 (1989) (holding that
states can tax oil produced within Indian country); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S.
621, 624 (1882) (holding states have criminal jurisdiction over crimes within Indian country
that only involve non-Indians).
283. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 51–52(1996); see also Lance
Morgan, The Rise of Tribes and the Fall of Federal Indian Law, 49 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 115, 123
(2017), http://arizonastatelawjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Morgan_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5WZX-LFLH] (“The states can usually impose their will indirectly on
tribes, ignoring conflicting tribal taxation laws because the states control the tribe’s access to
the stream of commerce.”).
284. Adam Crepelle, Taxes, Theft, and Indian Tribes: Seeking Tribal-State Tax Parity, 122 W.
VA. L. REV. 999, 1017–18 (2020).
285. Id. at 1029.
286. Id.
287. Crepelle, supra note 3, at 448–51.
288. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 206 (1987); Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 190 F. Supp. 3d 843, 845 (E.D. Wis.
2016).
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289

for grievances in state or tribal court? No business wants to deal
with this uncertainty.
Once tribal jurisdiction is recognized as exclusive over all persons in Indian country, tribes will be able to implement and apply
laws that govern their economies. This means tribal courts will
have the undisputed power to adjudicate all issues arising in Indian
country. The ability to enforce contracts will provide tribes with an
additional reason to adopt a version of the Uniform Commercial
290
Code. Likewise, tribes will have unquestioned authority to zone
291
all lands within their borders, so tribes will be able to meaning292
fully designate parcels of their land as industrial or commercial.
Tribes will also be able to issue enforceable business licenses and
293
other business regulations. Most significantly, tribes will be able
set their own tax rates—and will thus be able to fund themselves
like other governments.

289. E.g., Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 732 F.3d 409, 411 (2013);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959).
290. A version of the Uniform Commercial Code has been designed specifically for
tribes. MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT, (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2005),
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/ieed/ieed/pdf/idc1-024559.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R43G-AD93].
291. Cf. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Yakima Indian Nation Tribe only has the
authority to zone property in areas of its reservation that are closed to the general public).
292. Robert J. Miller, Inter-Tribal and International Treaties for American Indian Economic
Development, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1103, 1131, https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/9507lcb124art7millerpdf [https://perma.cc/VD9L-V7M8] (“Each Signatory Tribe shall establish
at least one formal trade zone within their territory where the terms and conditions of this
Treaty will apply.”).
293. Id. at 1122 (“[T]ribes can and will want to consider controlling in the licensing
phase when they decide what types of businesses they will allow to operate on their reservations.”).
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Tribal lawmaking and enforcement furthers not only tribal self294
determination but also tribal economic development. For example, legal reforms served as a catalyst for economic growth in South
295
296
Korea and China. Nobel Laurate Paul Romer notes that China’s reforms were not novel; rather, Romer points out that all China did was “copy good rules from the rest of the world, especially
297
its thriving neighbors in Hong Kong.” Culturally relevant laws are
298
also associated with enhanced tribal economic development.
When tribes agreed to relinquish their lands in exchange for
reservations, the reservations were supposed to serve as the tribes’
299
perpetual homes. Part of a tribe’s ability to foster this perpetual
294. MARIA DAKOLIAS, DAVID FREESTONE & PETER KYLE, WORLD BANK, LEGAL VICE
PRESIDENCY, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM: STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS 9 (2003),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/218071468779992785/pdf/
269160Legal0101e0also0250780SCODE09.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MMR-KKXR] (“It is
generally recognized that there are strong links between the rule of law, economic development, and poverty reduction . . . .”).
295. Seung Wha Chang, The Role of Law in Economic Development and Adjustment Process:
The Case of Korea, 34 INT’L L. 267, 269 (2000).
296. WORLD BANK, BUILDING ENGINES FOR GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS IN CHINA 12
(Douglas Zhihua Zeng ed., 2010), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
294021468213279589/pdf/564470PUB0buil10Box349496B01PUBLIC1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/374S-WA9R] (“The SEZs have made crucial contributions to China’s
success. Most of all, they—especially the first ones—successfully tested the market economy
and new institutions and established role models for the rest of the country to follow.”);
Connie Carter, The Success of Law and Development in China, Is China the Latest Asian Developmental State?, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA 89 (Gerald Paul McAlinn & Caslav Pejovic
eds., 2012), https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/302223/mod_resource/content/
1/CARTER.%20The%20success%20of%20law%20and%20development%20in%20
China.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N3U-6BRN] (“Upon succeeding Mao, Deng Xiaoping’s first
goal was to seek stability through law in order to foster economic growth in China. This he
summarized as a ‘two hands policy’: on the one hand, the economy must be developed; and
on the other the legal system must be strength-ened.”); Lan Cao, Rights Protection in International Criminal Law and Beyond: Charter Cities, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 717, 725–26 (2019)
(“China created copycat Hong Kongs first in the nearby city of Shenzhen, and then in other
special economic zones (SEZs) along the western and northern parts of the Pacific coast,
unleashing a great export boom that lifted an estimated 100 million Chinese above the onedollar-a-day subsistence.”).
297. PAUL ROMER, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., TECHNOLOGIES, RULES, AND PROGRESS: THE
CASE FOR CHARTER CITIES 4 (2010), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/
1423916_file_TechnologyRulesProgress_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F6F-XY72].
298. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to Economic Development on American Indian Reservations: One Works, the Other Doesn’t, in RESOURCES FOR NATION BUILDING:
GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN NATIONS 16 (Miriam
Jorgensen & Stephen Cornell eds., 2006), https://www.honigman.com/media/site_files/
111_imgimgjopna_2005-02_Approaches.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PTV-FF47] (“Where cultural match is high, economic development tends to be more successful.”).
299. See United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 113 (1938) (“The Indians agreed
that they would make the reservation their permanent home.”); Treaty of Fort Laramie,
U.S.-Sioux, Apr. 29, 1868, art. XV (“The Indians herein named agree that when the agency
house or other buildings shall be constructed on the reservation named, they will regard
said reservation their permanent home, and they will make no permanent settlement elsewhere . . . .”); Treaty of Fort Sumner, U.S.-Nav., June 1, 1868, art. XIII (“The tribe herein
named, by their representatives, parties to this treaty, agree to make the reservation herein
described their permanent home . . . .”).
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home lies in their ability to foster and sustain economic growth. After all, reservations will be an undesirable domicile without con300
tinued economic opportunities, and Indian country’s Kafkaesque
301
legal system keeps businesses from investing on tribal land. The
federal regulatory morass must be cleared in order for tribes to
302
control their economies. None other than President Andrew
303
Jackson—the most anti-Indian president in U.S. history —
believed Indians should be able govern reservations with minimal
304
federal involvement. This will allow tribes to experiment with
new rules, blending their traditional commercial practices with the
305
modern world. Moreover, the application of tribal law furthers

300. Associated Press, Choctaw Tribe Has Risen from Poverty to Economic Success, HERALDTRIB. (June 29, 2003, 3:06 AM), https://www.heraldtribune.com/article/LK/20030629/
news/605214974/SH [https://perma.cc/TJA8-TEYZ] (“Tribal members, drawn by better
living conditions and by jobs, began returning to the reservation, tripling tribal membership
to 9,000.”).
301. See Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing Business in Indian Country, 60 ME. L. REV. 1, 3
(2008) (“Substantial economic development in Indian country will not occur without significant infusions of outside capital, but investment by non-Indian and nongovernmental
sources is risky, or is perceived to be so, which leads to the same practical result.”).
302. See generally Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 49 (9th Cir. 1981)
(“Finally, we note that permitting the Indians to determine how to use reserved water is consistent with the general purpose for the creation of an Indian reservation providing a homeland for the survival and growth of the Indians and their way of life.”); In re General Adjudication of All Rights, 35 P.3d 68, 76 (Ariz. 2001) (“Just as the nation’s economy has evolved,
nothing should prevent tribes from diversifying their economies if they so choose and are
reasonably able to do so. The permanent homeland concept allows for this flexibility and
practicality.”).
303. Gale Courey Toensing, Indian-Killer Andrew Jackson Deserves Top Spot on List of Worst
US Presidents, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 10, 2017), https://newsmaven.io/
indiancountrytoday/archive/indian-killer-andrew-jackson-deserves-top-spot-on-list-of-worstus-presidents-q-Qg-O3lJUCE1bdhzyeS-A [https://perma.cc/H9CH-KYKG]; Eli Rosenberg,
Andrew Jackson Was Called Indian Killer. Trump Honored Navajos in Front of His Portrait, WASH.
POST (Nov. 28, 2017, 12:35 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/
2017/11/28/andrew-jackson-was-called-indian-killer-trump-honored-navajos-in-front-of-hisportrait/ [https://perma.cc/99YA-4NNG].
304. December 8, 1829: First Annual Message to Congress, U. VA.: MILLER CTR.,
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-8-1829-firstannual-message-congress [https://perma.cc/2CR8-877G] (“As a means of effecting this end
I suggest for your consideration the propriety of setting apart an ample district west of the
Mississippi, and without the limits of any state or territory now formed, to be guaranteed to
the Indian tribes as long as they shall occupy it, each tribe having a distinct control over the
portion designated for its use. There they may be secured in the enjoyment of governments
of their own choice, subject to no other control from the United States than such as may be
necessary to preserve peace on the frontier and between the several tribes.”).
305. See generally Gavin Clarkson, Tribal Bondage: Statutory Shackles and Regulatory Restraints
on Tribal Economic Development 20 (Univ. of Mich. John M. Olin Ctr. for L. & Econ., Paper
#06-006), https://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/lawandeconomics/abstracts/
2006/Documents/06-006clarkson.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WBD-XE6D] (“Many tribes pride
themselves on their ability to adapt: the Navajos developed a thriving weaving industry using
wool from sheep brought over by Europeans; the Plains Indians incorporated European
horses into their culture; and the Choctaw claim that if the Europeans had brought aluminum foil with them, Choctaws would have been cooking with it while the other tribes were
still regarding it with suspicion.”).
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the United States’ Indian policy of tribal self-determination. Tribal
law is the answer to Indian country’s economic doldrums.
CONCLUSION
In debates surrounding amendments to the Indian trader laws
in 1876, Congressman Martin Magninis posited:
What would be thought if the Government were to establish such a system of trade in all our villages and give to one
or more traders the right to establish the prices at which
goods should be sold and the rates which the working-man
should receive for the product of his labor? How long
would the people of this country stand it? Why should not
the Indians have the benefit of that competition which everywhere is the best regulator of prices? 306
Congressman Magninis also noted, “The history of American trade
with the Indians is not a record that we can be peculiarly proud
307
of.”
Over a century has passed since Congressman Magninis’s remarks. Much has changed in the United States, including the nation’s Indian policy. Assimilation was the Indian policy of Congressman Magninis’s day. Self-determination is the United States’
current Indian policy. Nonetheless, the outmoded, ineffective, and
racist laws that hamstrung Indians in Congressman Magninis’s era
continue to undermine tribal economies.
The complexities that accompany restrictions on tribal trust
land and Indian trader laws scare non-Indian investors away from
Indian country. 308 There is no logical reason why opening a hamburger stand on a reservation should require the federal government’s blessing. 309 Moreover, the federal government has a ghastly
record in the realm of Indian economic development and resource

306. Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 1971).
307. Id.
308. See U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFS., IDENTIFYING ECONOMIC
PRIORITIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY: TRANSCRIPT OF TRIBAL CONSULTATION 52–53 (Aug. 22,
2017), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia_prod.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/assets/as-ia/raca/
pdf/08-22-17.Portland%20OR%20Transcript_Indian%20Traders%2025%20CFR%
20140.pdf [https://perma.cc/59ZZ-2234].
309. See id. at 69; see also Letter from Lance Morgan, CEO, Ho-Chunk, Inc., to Off. of the
Assistant Sec’y – Indian Affs. 1 (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/
assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/15%20-%20Ho-Chunk%20Inc.pdf [https://perma.cc/9469-7LD4].
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310

management. Red tape is not the obstacle to tribal economic development; rather, the tape is white, and it needs to be cut.

310. AM. INDIAN POL’Y REV. COMM’N, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION
FINAL
REPORT
339
(1977),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED164229.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ALF-JXP8] (noting the agreements by the federal government on behalf of tribes are “among the poorest agreements ever made”); see also Terry L. Anderson,
Presidential Medal of Freedom Should Come with Freedom for American Indians, FORBES (Nov. 22,
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/11/22/presidental-medal-offreedomshould-come-with-freedom-for-american-indians/#797109594e5c [https://perma.cc/A3FM4TGE] (“The suit alleged that the federal government as the trustee for Indian lands had
withheld and even lost more than $150 billion received for oil, timber, mineral and other
leases of Indian lands. Ultimately the suit grew into a class action claim with as many as
500,000 plaintiffs claiming a federal liability of $176 billion.”); Jerry Reynolds, Navajo Win
Another Round over Peabody, NBC NEWS (May 5, 2004, 4:45 PM), http://www.
nbcnews.com/id/4908465/ns/us_news-life/t/navajo-win-another-round-over-peabody/
#.Xb-YGehKjIU [https://perma.cc/3CCY-NP27] (noting the Secretary of the Interior refused to increase Navajo Nation coal royalties after a private meeting with Peabody Coal representatives).

